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GENTILE V. STATE BAR OF NEVADA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE MEDIA
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada' a narrowly divided United States
Supreme Court held that while a state supreme court's rule that restricted
attorney speech was void for vagueness, the standard employed by the rule
did not violate the First Amendment. 2 The rule in question, Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177, 3 states that a lawyer involved in pending litigation cannot

1. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
2. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991).
3. NEv. Sup. CT. R. 177. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is based on the ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6. Courts in the vast majority of states have adopted Model
Rule 3.6 in part or in whole. Model Rule 3.6 reads as follows:
Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity
a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to have such an effect
when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other
proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect
in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the
expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the
possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense, or the existence or contents of
any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or
any person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or
failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or
nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a
criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be
inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial
likelihood of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime unless there is
included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation
and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) or (b) (1-5), a lawyer involved in the investigation
of litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(I) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the general
scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and,
except where prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary
thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when
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make statements to the press that the lawyer knows or should reasonably
know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 4 The question of whether such a restriction is a form
of prior restraint, subject to strict constitutional scrutiny, has divided lower
courts.' In upholding the "substantial likelihood" test, a majority of the
Court, led by Justice Rehnquist, resolved this division and found that the
speech restriction at issue in Gentile does not constitute a prior restraint on
the press.6 Because the restriction was not a prior restraint, the Court held
that strict constitutional scrutiny, embodied in the clear and present danger
7
test, was not the appropriate standard of review for these restrictions.
In characterizing the Gentile restriction, the Rehnquist majority distinguished between restrictions that limit attorneys' speech and restrictions that
limit the media's dissemination of information." The Court in Gentile
acknowledged that any restriction of the press' First Amendment rights
would constitute a prior restraint on the press and would therefore be
subject to the strict scrutiny of the clear and present danger test.9 However,
the Court refused to protect attorney speech within the context of pending
litigation to the same degree as the Court protected the media.' 0 Instead,
the Rehnquist majority concluded that attorney speech is subject to greater
regulation because of both an attorney's relationship to the judicial process
and the significant dangers that attorney speech poses to the trial process."
Accordingly, the Court in Gentile held that Rule 177's substantial likelihood
of material prejudice standard strikes an acceptable balance between preserving both the attorney's First Amendment rights and the state's interest
2
in fair trials.'
While restrictions on an attorney's speech in pending litigation do not
fall under the traditional model of a prior restraint, in many circumstances,
there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm
to any individual or to the public interest; and
(i.) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
(ii.) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to
aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii.) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv.) the identity of investigation and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.6 (Approved Draft 1983).
4. See id.
5. See infra notes 195-223 and accompanying text (comparing courts' different treatments
of Gentile rules).
6. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2747.
7. Id. at 2745; see infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text (discussing clear and present
danger test).
8. Gentile, I11 S. Ct. at 2743.
9. Id. at 2742-43.
10. Id. at 2744.

11. Id. at 2744-45. Justice Rehnquist stated that an attorney's speech is especially
dangerous because of an attorney's privileged access to judicially discovered information and
also because the public perceives attorneys' statements as especially authoritative. Id. at 2735.
12. Id. at 2745.
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such restrictions may achieve the same effect and entail the same dangers., 3
Prior restraints "freeze" speech and the dissemination of information by
4
prohibiting the publication or broadcast of information by the media .
Similarly, restrictions on attorney speech freeze both the speech and the
dissemination of information by prohibiting a potential source from contacting the press and supplying the public with valuable information. 15 Such
a restriction invariably creates a categorical bar on the release of information
6
about the judicial system to the press.'
In theory, a Gentile rule 7 is a restriction aimed at irresponsible attorneys
who exploit the press; in reality, a Gentile rule inhibits the ability of all
attorneys to comment on judicial, political and executive abuses, speech
that is undisputedly at the core of First Amendment protection." Traditionally, the heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior
restraints maintained a media free from government censorship for the
purpose of checking political abuses, informing the public and ensuring the
free exchange of ideas.' 9 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Gentile
thwarts this constitutional ideal. The Court's validation of the substantial
likelihood standard makes prosecution of an attorney's speech increasingly
probable; this, in turn, creates a substantial incentive for attorneys involved
in pending litigation to refrain from discussing judicial proceedings with the
media.
In analyzing the effect of Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada on the First
Amendment guarantee of a free press, this Note will explore the reasoning
underlying the Court's decision in Gentile and will determine whether the
outcome is consistent with traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. Part
I outlines the evolution of judicial protection of the press from government
restriction and discusses the judicial treatment of prior restraints, indirect
restraints and finally, Gentile rules. This section will examine the various
standards of review that are applicable to the different types of restrictions
on the press and the policies that underlie these standards of review. By
comparing both indirect restraints and Gentile rules to prior restraints, it
will become apparent that both restraints seek to accomplish the same

13. See infra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing similarities of Gentile rules
and prior restraints).
14. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (describing freezing effect of prior restraints).
15. See infra notes 169-79 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect of sanctions
on attorney's speech).
16. See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text (describing effects of Gentile rule).
17. For purposes of simplicity and to distinguish it from both prior restraints and
participant-directed gag orders, a judicially enforced restriction on an attorney's speech will
hereafter be referred to as a Gentile rule. A Gentile rule is a disciplinary or court-enforced
rule regulating extrajudicial attorney speech. See generally Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111
S. Ct. 2720 (1990).
18. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing speech denouncing political
abuses and press' checking function).
19. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HAsTiNGs L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (describing
intention of framers to create "fourth institution" to check against political abuses).
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objective and share many constitutional foibles. Part II analyzes the Court's
holding in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada and contrasts the majority's
approach with the constitutional treatment advocated by the dissent. Part

III comments on the Supreme Court's endorsement of the substantial
likelihood test and measures the degree to which this less demanding test
can be reconciled with prior restraint doctrine and First Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV considers the possible ramifications of Gentile
to First Amendment jurisprudence and, more specifically, to the media's
ability to gather information relating to the judicial system and subsequently
to disseminate that information to the public. The Gentile decision arguably
weakens the ability of the press to report on the judicial system and decreases
the public's access to information about the variety of public functions that

courts review within that system.
I.

PRESS

PROTECTION UNDER THE

A.

FIRST

AMENDMENT

The PriorRestraint Doctrine

The framer's chief purpose in adopting the First Amendment's Press

Clause" was to protect the press against a system of government censorship
and prior restraints on publication. 21 The guarantee distinguished the emerging American press system from the English system, where prior licensing

of all publications temporarily had prevailed.22 The American judicial system
has been demonstrably more protective of an uncensored press and increasingly disinclined to grant judicial approval of any restriction resembling a

prior restraint upon publication.2 3 Moreover, American First Amendment

20. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ." Id.
21. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (stating that
framers adopted First Amendment to prevent use of seditious libel and prior restraint to punish
dissemination of information embarrassing to government); Carroll v. Comm'rs of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 n.5 (1968) (noting that chief purpose behind adoption of First
Amendment was elimination of prior restraints); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43, 53-54 (discussing purpose behind adoption of First Amendment), reh'g denied, 365
U.S. 856 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (remarking that Press Clause
has meant principally freedom from prior restraints); see also Michael E. Swartz, Note, Trial
ParticipantSpeech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1411,
1419 (1990) (stating that rejection of prior restraints forms First Amendment's core). Compare
LEONARD LEvy, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss 233-36, 236 n.38 (1988) (arguing that
freedom of press meant solely freedom from prior restraint) with David A. Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 534-35 (1983) (rejecting contention that
Press Clause protected only against prior restraint).
22. See Thomas Irwin Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEM .
PROaS. 648, 650-52 (1955) [hereinafter Prior Restraint] (noting that doctrine of prior restraint
had roots in sixteenth century English licensing systems, which required government approval
of written material prior to publication); see also John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior
Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412-14 (1983) (same).
23. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931) (stating that First Amendment
protection extended beyond freedom from prior restraint).
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jurisprudence has been unwilling to limit its protection of the press to
Blackstonian notions and has extended its protection beyond freedom from
prior restraint.2 The Supreme Court has continued to respect the framers'
commitment to a free press and has repeatedly emphasized the press' ability
to check against political and judicial abuses by subjecting the government
to public scrutiny and criticism. 2
While the government did not impose prior restraints during early
American history, the twentieth century revived the debate over the scope
26
of press protection under the First Amendment. In Near v. Minnesota
the
Supreme Court for the first time examined the prior restraint doctrine. 27 In
Near the Court considered the constitutional validity of a state statute that
permitted the suppression by injunction of any defamatory publication.2
Considering the constitutional interaction of the press and the government,
the Court stated that the fundamental purpose underlying the Press Clause
was to prevent prior restraints on the press. 29 Acknowledging that the statute
at issue was not an administrative licensing scheme of traditional form, the
Near Court found that the statute, nevertheless, functioned like the English
system of prior administrative censorship.?0 While the statute, at first glance,
appeared to involve subsequent punishment, the Court recognized that the
statute perpetually enjoined publication in a manner that would force an
enjoined publisher to seek judicial approval for future publications or face
a contempt charge.3 1 The Near Court, therefore, held that the Minnesota
24. 4 WmmiLM BLACKSTONE, ComINTARTEs 151-52 (Robert Malcolm Kerr ed., 1962).
Blackstone wrote that:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity.
Id. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979) (stating that First
Amendment protection extends beyond freedom from prior restraints); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 (1936) (stating impossibility of accepting that framers intended
to adopt narrow view of English law); MELvIL B. NMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 4.02, at 4-11 (1984) (recognizing modem divergence from Blackstonian acceptance of
subsequent punishments).
25. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (recognizing checking function
of press); see also Stewart, supra note 19, at 634 (describing importance of Free Press Clause
and suggesting that framers intended Press Clause to create fourth institution outside of
government as additional check on three official branches); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Ray. 245, 256 (arguing that self-government
requires freedom of speech and press).
26. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
27. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
28. Id. at 709.
29. Id. at 713.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 711-12. The Near Court also reasoned that the restriction on publication of
defamatory material was too broad and that a validation of the law would move one step
toward a complete system of censorship. Id. at 712-13.
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statute, by its operation and effect, functioned as a prior restraint.3 2 Near
illustrates a judicial willingness to expand the ban against prior restraints
to prevent not only the government licensing schemes eschewed by Blackstone3
but also to prevent injunctions on speech and publication that had a similar
effect.3 4 This doctrinal expansion, which the Supreme Court based on a
determination of the operation and effect of the statute-concern over
function rather than form-would become the touchstone of modem prior
restraint analysis.35
Following the Near decision, subsequent cases firmly entrenched the
modern notion that prior restraint doctrine encompasses judicial injunctions
on publication and speech, as well as administrative licensing schemes, and
36
that the First Amendment's protection extends beyond prior restraints.
However, these cases failed to define what forms of restraints constituted
a prior restraint and, instead, merely reiterated the presumption against
prior restraints. 37 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,3 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that any system of prior restraints on expression comes to the
Court bearing a "heavy presumption" against the system's constitutional-

32. Id. at 712. See Sheryl A. Bjork, Comment, Indirect Gag Orders and the Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 44 U. Mxpn L. REv. 165, 171 (1989) (acknowledging that Near's broad
interpretation, and willingness to examine statute's operation and effect, has served as cornerstone of prior restraint analysis).
33. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (capsuiizing Blackstone's interpretation of
First Amendment).
34. See Bjork, supra note 32, at 170-71 (stating that Near expanded doctrine beyond
traditional licensing schemes to injunctions on speech and publication).
35. See id. at 171-72 (discussing Court's doctrinal "leap" in Near).
36. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 378 (1947) (striking down contempt order
prohibiting press from publishing judicial criticism); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 34950 (1946) (same); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941) (same); see also Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979) (stating that First Amendment's protection
extends beyond prior restraints); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931) (invalidating
state statute because, although it was not classic prior restraint in form, statute operated and
had effect of imposing judicial censorship); Jeffries, supra note 22, at 419 (detailing extension
of prior restraint doctrine beyond traditional administrative licensing schemes); Emerson, Prior
Restraint, supra note 22, at 655-56 (describing four potential categories of prior restraints).
37. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 82 (1963) (invalidating state statute
that allowed interruption of circulation of designated publications); Organization for a Better
Austin, v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (holding that government carries heavy burden of
justifying restraint).
38. 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). In Bantam Books, the Supreme Court considered a Rhode
Island law that created a state commission that had the power to investigate and prosecute
the distribution of obscene publications. Id. at 61. Several publishers and book distributors
challenged the constitutionality of the commission. Id. The Supreme Court held that the
activities of the commission were indeed unconstitutional for several reasons. Id. at 64. First,
the commission had stopped the circulation of several publications. Id. at 68. Second, while
the state had the power to regulate obscene materials, the commission had obviated the use
of criminal sanctions and had eliminated the safeguards afforded by the criminal process. Id.
at 69-70. The Court concluded that the activities of such a commission amounted to a system
of administrative preclearance that constituted the most suspect form of prior restraint. Id. at
70-72.
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ity. 9 The Supreme Court has affirmed this presumption repeatedly and has
40
relied on this presumption to justify the quick disposal of prior restraints.
Historically, the government has attempted to justify prior restraints in two
limited contexts: national security concerns and fair trial-free press dilemma. 4' While the Supreme Court has never absolutely barred a prior
restraint in either context, the government has never satisfied the heavy
42
burden required to rebut the presumption against prior restraints.
43
New York Times Co. v. United States demonstrates the difficulty that
the government faces in justifying the imposition of a prior restraint. 44 In
New York Times the Supreme Court weighed the countervailing interests
of national security and uncensored publication and held that the government had failed to meet the heavy burden required to justify a prior
restraint.45 The Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that
the executive branch had the inherent power to protect national interests by
restraining the publication of information that threatened national security.4
Relying on Bantam Books and Near, the Court in New York Times stated
that prior restraints bear a heavy presumption against constitutional validity
and held that the government had not met this burden. 47 While a consistent
rationale for analyzing prior restraints did not emerge from the nine separate
opinions in New York Times,4 the failure of the government to meet its

39. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 n.16 (invalidating
prior restraint), reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 947 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 558 (1976) (same); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975)
(same).
41. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (examining prior

restraint doctrine in context of fair trial-free press controversy); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (considering prior restraint doctrine in national security

context).
42. See, e.g., Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570 (holding that government did not meet

heavy burden in fair trivl-free press controversy); New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (holding
that government did not meet heavy burden in national security context).
43. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In New York Times the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
expedited review to hear argument on the question of whether the government could obtain
an injunction restraining the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a
classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." Id.
at 714. The Court stated that the government was required to meet a heavy burden of showing

justification for the imposition of the restraint. Id. The Supreme Court held, six to three, that
the government had not met this heavy burden and vacated the two lower courts' temporary
restraining orders. Id. See infra note 48 (describing divergent opinions filed in New York
Times).
44. New York Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 714.
48. See Roger W. Pincus, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada & the Need for
a New Analytical Approach, 135 U. PA. L. R~v. 813, 826 (1987) (noting lack of coherent
approach to national security exception to prior restraint doctrine). The New York Times

Court held that the lower court should lift the injunction, and even the dissenters noted that
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burden where the state interest was arguably at its most compelling levelduring wartime-demonstrates that exceptions to the bar against prior
49
restraints are difficult to imagine.
Similarly in Nebraska PressAssociation v. Stuart,50 the government also
failed to overcome the heavy presumption against prior restraints in the fair
trial-free press controversy." While acknowledging the seemingly opposing
prior restraints are typically constitutionally invalid. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714. The
disagreement in the majority opinion in large part relates to its members' disagreement over
whether the government could have invoked a subsequent punishment, such as the Espionage
Act, in response to the Times publication. See Frederick Schauer, Parsing the Pentagon Papers,
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center of Press, Politics & Public Policy Research Paper R-3, at 2
(1991) (recognizing that, while all members of majority agreed that prior restraints were
unconstitutional, two members were unwilling to conclude that subsequent punishment would
have also violated First Amendment). Although the Justices in New York Times disagreed
over the acceptability of applying subsequent punishments to the newspapers, the disagreement
in the majority relates more to the Justices' different conceptualizations of the First Amendment. Justices Stewart's and White's concurrences seemed to mark the centrist position on the
Court. Both Justices made it clear that the government would have to meet an exceptional
burden to justify a prior restraint. Id. at 728-30 (Stewart, J. concurring, joined by White),
Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J.,). The government would have to
show that the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers would result in a "direct, immediate, and
irreparable harm" to the Nation or its people. Id. at 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined
by White, J.).
49. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714. But cf. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467
F. Supp. 991 (W.D. Wis.) (involving attempt to enjoin magazine from publishing article
detailing assembly of nuclear bomb pursuant to Atomic Energy Act), appeal dismissed, 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
50. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Nebraska Press the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to consider the constitutionality of a lower court's injunction; the injunction restrained
the media from disseminating information that could threaten the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to fair trial. Id. at 541-42. The Court held that the barriers to prior restraint remain
high and the presumption against such a restraint remains intact. Id. at 561. The Court also
recognized the importance of reporting a criminal proceeding. Id. at 559. The Court stated
that the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior restraint was not met by the
lower court in Nebraska Press. Id. at 570. The Court established a three-pronged test that a
court must meet in order to justify the imposition of a prior restraint. Id. at 562. See infra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska Press' three-pronged test).
51. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570. See generally United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d
1543 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 451 (1990) (reviewing trial court's injunction of
broadcast until it could review information and weigh defendant's Sixth Amendment fair trial
claim). In NoriegaCable News Network (CNN) obtained tape recordings of phone conversations
between a criminal defendant and his attorneys, made while he was awaiting trial. Id. at 1545.
Prior to CNN's broadcast of the tapes, the defense counsel obtained an injunction prohibiting
CNN from broadcasting any portion of the tapes. See United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp.
1032, 1036 (1990). CNN refused to turn the tapes over to the judge so that an evaluation of
the threat posed to Noriega's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial could be made. Noriega,
917 F.2d at 1546-47. Because the district court judge was unable to review the tapes due to
CNN's refusal, the Eleventh Circuit denied CNN's appeal of the injunction. Id. at 1552. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari even though two Justices criticized the Court's refusal to
resolve the lower court holdings which seemed in conflict with the Nebraska Press standards.
See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 111 S. Ct. 451, 451 (1990) (Marshall, J., and
O'Connor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.05-4-28 (Supp. 1991).
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demands of the media's First Amendment rights and the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, the Court rejected the establishment of a
general hierarchy within the Bill of Rights that would favor one right over
another. 2 The Court stated that First Amendment rights were not absolute
and that a court could constitutionally maintain a prior restraint on the
press only if the "gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 53
to apply this amorphous
The Supreme Court devised a three-pronged test
54
standard to the fair trial-free press controversy.
The first prong of the Nebraska Press test requires a court to assess

the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage.55 To satisfy the first prong,
a court must find that a risk of pervasive publicity exists that could prejudice
prospective jurors.5 6 The second prong of the test requires a court to consider
whether other alternative methods would likely mitigate the effects of any

pretrial publicity. 57 The third prong requires a court to ascertain whether a
prior restraint would be effective in preventing the threatened danger. Many
commentators have concluded that satisfying all three-prongs of Nebraska
Press, and thereby justifying the imposition of a prior restraint, is impossible. 8 Yet the Supreme Court has steadfastly maintained that courts should

52. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561.
53. Id. at 562. This formula is Learned Hand's reformulation of the clear and present
danger test that the Supreme Court adopted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
See Rene L. Todd, Note, A PriorRestraint by Any Other Name: The JudicialResponse to
Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants,88 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1171, 1176
n.29 (1990) (stating that Nebraska Press modeled its test on Learned Hand's version of clear
and present danger test).
54. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562. See Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm and SelfGovernment: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 1453, 1488 (1991) (noting that, although Court decided Nebraska Press during Brandenburg era, Court used Dennis formulation of clear and present danger standard); see also Benno
C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of
Tpeory, 29 STAN. L. Ray. 431, 464 (1977) (recognizing Court's use of ad hoe balancing).
While the Nebraska Press three-pronged test employed ad hoc balancing, it also seemed to
demand a strict scrutiny level of review. See infra note 301 (discussing narrowly tailored
requirements of strict scrutiny review).
55. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562.
56. Id. See also James C. Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The PracticalEffect on Gag
Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 27 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 (1977)
(observing that first prong of Nebraska Press test may require showing of actual prejudice,
which may be impossible because court could only satisfy showing at voir dire, and prior
restraints would be imposed prior to voir dire).
57. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562. See also Goodale, supra note 57, at 500 (arguing
that it would be impossible for court to meet second prong of Nebraska Press test in light of
Justice Clark's admonition that alternative means, falling short of prior restraint, would have
been sufficient to guarantee fair trial in Sheppard,where prejudice and inflammatory character
of publicity were arguably at apex).
1 58. See SMOLLA, supra note 51, § 4.05, 4-28 (remarking that concurring opinions following
majority opinion justified critics' conclusion that Nebraska Press resulted in absolutism); Todd,
supra note 53, at 1176 (concluding that presumption against prior restraints, manifested in
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not deem prior restraints per se unconstitutional. s9
Whether a court extends protection to the press hinges on whether the
court categorizes a restriction as a prior restraint or a subsequent punishmentA° Historically, valid reasons for distinguishing between the two types

three-pronged test, functions as virtual ban); Goodale, supra note 56, at 513 (arguing that
court could not possibly meet three-pronged test). Goodale states that while the Supreme Court
stated that exceptions to the presumption against prior restraints exist, the Court created a
test for those exceptions that is impossible to meet. Id. See also Scott A. Hagen, Note, KUTV
v. Wilkinson: Another Episode in the Fair Trial/Free Press Saga, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 739,
754 (arguing that court could not possibly satisfy Nebraska Press test and that Supreme Court
should adopt absolute rule in order to avoid unnecessary litigation, overuse of gag orders and
temporary delay of publication while order is appealed). But see Cable News Network, Inc.
v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding injunction where network's failure
to produce tapes for court inspection prevented district court's required balancing of First and
Sixth Amendment rights); Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L.
Rav. 539, 541 (1977) (positing that Nebraska Press standard probably is least protective
standard to appear in Court's opinions since development of modem First Amendment law);
Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by
Defendants & Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 607,
609, 619 (1977) (noting differing opinions of justices as to how high courts should make
barriers to prior restraint and noting that analysis ironically may advocate imposition of prior
restraints trial participants).
59. Cf. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561 (stating that barriers to prior restraint remain
high but inferring that barriers could conceivably be overcome); Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d. 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that prior restraints are not per se
unconstitutional under Supreme Court's rulings), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). However,
at least two courts have applied the Nebraska Press three-pronged test and upheld a gag order.
See KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Super. Ct., 459 U.S. 1302, 1308 (1982) (denying
media application for stay based on trial judge's adequate Nebraska Press findings); KUTV,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456, 462 (Utah 1984) (affirming trial judge's indirect restraint
because requisite Nebraska Press findings were made).
60. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of subsequent
punishment and disadvantages of prior restraint). If the court determines that a restriction is
a prior restraint, the restraint will be presumptively invalid. See supra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text (discussing New York Times). If the court determines that a restriction is
a subsequent punishment, the court will typically determine whether the restriction shares any
characteristics of a prior restraint. A determination that the restriction resembles a prior
restraint would likely cause the court to invalidate the restriction. See supra notes 26-34
(discussing Near). If the court determines that the restriction is a subsequent punishment, the
court will weigh the state interest against the individual's liberty interest to determine if the
restriction is constitutionally acceptable. See infra note 77 (discussing briefly Landmark
Communications). However, the preceding analysis depends on the courts' ability to clearly
identify and discern the two forms of First Amendment restriction.
While the doctrine of prior restraint is largely defined by contrasting these restraints from
subsequent punishments, courts have found that distinguishing prior restraints from subsequent
punishments often is difficult. This difficulty stems from the failure of restrictions on expression
to conform to their historical definitions. The traditional definition of a prior restraint is an
"official restriction imposed 6n speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication," as opposed to a subsequent punishment which occurs "after the communication
has been made as a punishment for having made it." Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note
22, at 648. The most common manifestation of a system of subsequent punishment is a
criminal statute punishing "illegitimate" speech or publication. See generally Smith v. Daily
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of restrictions may exist. 6' In the past, courts predicated their categorical
rejection of prior restraints on the existence of a more palatable form of
speech restriction-subsequent punishment. 62 However, courts have quietly
deemphasized the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments in modem First Amendment jurisprudence. 63 Most modem corn-

Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (examining West Virginia statute which criminalized
newspaper's publication of names of juveniles involved in juvenile proceedings); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (reviewing Virginia statute that penalized
dissemination of information relating to ongoing judicial impropriety investigation).
61. See THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEaoM OF EXPREsSiON 506 (1971)
[hereinafter SYsTEM] (remarking that prior restraints censure wider range of expression, do not
include safeguards of criminal process and dynamics of system tend toward excess). Subsequent
punishments are thought to have numerous advantages over prior restraints. Subsequent
punishments punish expression after its dissemination, allowing the idea or expression to be
placed into the marketplace of ideas. See Swartz, supra note 21, at 1430 (stating that subsequent
punishment delays punishment until punished speaker exhausts appellate review and court
knows contested expression's impact, thereby reducing possibility of erroneous suppression).
Courts impose prior restraints, on the other hand, before expression, erecting an insurmountable
barrier between the expression and the marketplace of ideas and placing the burden of
demonstrating the validity of the expression on the speaker. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper
Role of the PriorRestraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. Rnv. 53, 55-57
(1984) (noting that prior restraints are constitutionally dangerous because of delay that occurs
while enjoined party waits for adversary hearing). Alternatively, prior restraints freeze a wider
range of expression for the following reasons: A qourt enforces the restraints through a court's
contempt power; prior restraints provide a more accessible form of censorship; and prior
restraints provide less opportunity for public appraisal of the expression. See Matin Scordato,
Distinction -Without a Difference: A Reappraisalof the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C.
L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1989) (noting that traditionally courts disfavor prior restraints partially
because ease of imposition leads to greater censorship).
62. See Swartz, supra note 21, at 1419 (noting that subsequent punishments are preferable
to prior restraints); Jeffries, supra note 22, at 410-11 (recognizing that presumption against
prior restraints relates to existence of less restrictive systems of subsequent punishment);
LAURENCE TaimE, A~micAN CONSTrrruoNAL LAW §§ 12-31, at 725 (1978) (noting that prior
restraints are especially dangerous because restraint occurs prior to adequate judicial determination of whether restrained expression falls within scope of First Amendment protection);
Barnett, supra note 58, at 543 (stating that courts should invalidate prior restraints because
subsequent punishments are less restrictive alternative); Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note
22, at 648 (noting that state .can impose speech restrictions in form of subsequent punishment
that would be invalid if imposed through prior restraint).
63. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979) (minimizing
distinction between subsequent punishments and prior restraints); Worrell Newspapers of
Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1984) (same), aff'd without opinion,
469 U.S. 1200 (1985). In both Daily Mail and Worrell Newspapers, the Supreme Court
appeared to deemphasize the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments.
In Daily Mail, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute
that criminalized the publication, without approval from the court, of the names of juveniles
involved in criminal proceedings. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 101. The Court held that the case
did not turn on whether or not the statute was a prior restraint because the First Amendment's
protection extended beyond prior restraints. Id. The Court stated that "whether we view the
statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction ... is not dispositive because even the latter
action [subsequent punishment] requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity."
Id. at 101-02. The Court struck down the statute because the state interest did not outweigh
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mentators agree that the differences between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments are no longer significant,6 4 particularly in light of the decreased
application of the collateral bar rule.65 Critics argue that the distinction
between prior restraints and subsequent punishments inadequately addresses
the modern dilemmas of press restrictions and that prior restraints are
preferable to subsequent punishments." In light of this criticism, whether

the newspaper's First Amendment interest. Id. at 104.
In Worrell Newspapers, a reporter challenged an Indiana statute that provided a criminal
punishment for anyone publishing the name of an individual against whom the state had filed
a sealed criminal indictment. Worrell Newspapers, 739 F.2d at 1221. The Seventh Circuit
rejected the State's argument that the statute was not a prior restraint but rather a subsequent
punishment. Id. at 1222. The Seventh Circuit cited Daily Mail for the contention that the
prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy "is a distinction without a difference, and
the Supreme Court has recently eliminated this semantic distinction." Id. The Seventh Circuit's
contention is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed Worrell Newspapers
without opinion. 469 U.S. 1200 (1985). But see Schauer, supra note 48, at 3-4 (noting that,
despite broad academic attack on distinction, neither Supreme Court or press has been willing
to dismiss distinction).
64. See Scordato, supra note 61, at 2 (noting that term prior restraint has become legal
misnomer and source of controversy and confusion); TRIBE, supra note 62, §§ 12-34, at 1040
(stating that distinction between subsequent punishments and prior restraints is not valid).
65. See Jeffries, supra note 22, at 431 (stating that injunctions are more restrictive due
to collateral bar rule); Todd, supra note 53, at 1182-84 (discussing collateral bar rule's impact
on trial-participant directed gag orders); Goodale, supra note 58, at 504-12 (discussing collateral
attacks on prior restraints). The injunctive powers of the court are particularly threatening
because of the collateral bar rule. See generally Christine Hasiotis, Transparently Invalid
Exception to the Collateral Bar Rule Under the First Amendment in the Federal Courts-In
re Providence Journal, XXI SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 265 (1987) (discussing collateral bar rule);
Richard E. Lubunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Enforcing UnconstitutionalOrders, 37 AM. U. L. Rav. 323 (1988) (same). Courts
have held that the validity of a judicial contempt order is determined by the court imposing
the order. See Hasiotis, supra at 268. Thus, individuals who violate a court order cannot
appeal an ensuing contempt charge by contesting the order's constitutionality. Id. This
prohibition against collateral attack on a contempt charge is called the collateral bar rule. Id.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged limitations on the collateral bar rule that have led many
courts to revise their application of the collateral bar rule. Id. at 268; see Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (holding that contested injunction was not transparently invalid
but acknowledging existence of exception), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 894 (1967) ; In re Providence
Journal, 820 F.2d 1342, 1353 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding challenged injunction was transparently
invalid), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 814 (1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (applying
transparently invalid exception).
66. See L. A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 55, 64 (1990)
(discussing advantages that prior restraints have over subsequent punishments); Vincent Blasi,
Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. Rav. 11, 47 (1981)
(rejecting contention that prior restraints engender more self-censorship); Jeffries, supra note
22, at 419-20 (arguing that doctrine of prior restraint is no longer needed); LEv, supra note
21, at 13 (noting that subsequent punishments have effect similar to prior restraints); Barnett,
supra note 58, at 551 (noting that narrow freeze of gag order may produce less chilling effect
overall than broader chill of threatened subsequent penalties). Critics have also pointed to
other inconsistencies in the dichotomy. Punishments under a system of subsequent punishment
are typically harsher than those imposed under a system of prior restraint. See Blasi, supra at
26-27 (discussing subsequent punishments greater potential for severe sanctions). Whereas the

1992]

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEDIA

the prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy can actually identify
67
when restrictions on the press violate the First Amendment is questionable.
Although this dichotomy seems unable to address the realities of the
modern media, there remains one other viable component of the Supreme
Court's traditional analysis of free press controversies: the application of
strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court's long standing reliance on a
categorical approach to free press cases, 6s embodied in the prior restraintsubsequent punishment dichotomy, at first may seem at odds with a standard
of strict scrutiny review. 69 Admittedly, courts' inveterate reliance on this
categorical approach has resulted in a schizophrenic analysis of the two
punishment for a prior restraint is criminal contempt, subsequent punishments typically result
in criminal fines, damages, or imprisonment. Id. Both forms of restraint inevitably threaten
punishment prior to expression. Jeffries, supra note 22, at 427 (noting that under both systems
threat of punishment precedes expression). Critics also have argued that the distinction focuses
erroneously on the method, and not the nature, of the restriction, is logically inconsistent in
application, and that the "chilling" effect produced by subsequent punishments is arguably
equal to, if not greater than, the effect of a prior restraint. See Scordato, supra note 61, at
28-29 (criticizing prior restraint doctrine's focus on desired result rather than identifying
characteristics and noting similarity of prior restraint's and subsequent punishment's chilling
effects); Robert D. Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 411, 415-16 (1977) (stating that logically inconsistent results occur from application of
different standards).
67. See Barnett, supra note 58, at 540 (arguing that reliance on prior restraint-subsequent
punishment dichotomy may lead to constitutionally unacceptable results). If the dichotomy,
and the resulting different treatment given to prior restraints and subsequent punishments, is
not appropriate, continued reliance on prior restraint doctrine as an indicator of what standard
of review is warranted could deny protection to restrictions on the press that do not fit under
the prior restraint umbrella, although they may be equally restrictive in effect. See Scordato,
supra note 61, at 30-31 (calling for revision of prior restraint doctrine to include all governmental actions that result in physical interception and suppression of speech prior to its
expression).
68. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court's changing use of categorical and balancing
analytical approaches). It is possible that the prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy
was one holdover from the nineteenth century Supreme Court's reliance on categorical, rather
than balancing, analysis. Id. at 949-52.
69. Id. at 943-44 (describing evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence from nonbalancing
to balancing approaches). Aleinikoff argues persuasively that the Court's opinions of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not employ balancing as a method of constitutional
argument. Id. at 949-52. The author argues that early Supreme Court analysis concentrated
foremost on categorizing the state interest at issue in any given case. Id. at 951. The Supreme
Court resolved controversies in a categorical manner; early decisions generally acknowledged
differences in form and not degree. Id. at 949. Instead of balancing the state interest against
the liberty interest of the individual, the Court considered the reasonableness of the, state
action based upon identifiable characteristics of the action and categorized it as either legitimate
or illegitimate. Id. Early Supreme Court analysis focused on the strength of the state interest
rather than on a balance of competing interests. Id. The Court's singular reliance on the prior
restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy reflects this same form of analysis; the Court
categorizes the restriction as either a prior restraint or subsequent punishment based upon
characteristics carried over from English common law. The resulting categorization necessarily
dictates the strength of the state's interest and the ability of the restriction to pass constitutional
muster.
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identifiable forms of press restrictions. While the Supreme Court has applied
the clear and present danger test in other First Amendment contexts as part
of a strict scrutiny analysis, 70 the Court has been reluctant to apply the test

consistently to both the prior restraint and the subsequent punishment
restrictions on the press' freedom. Although the potent early twentieth

century Abrams-Whitnefl version of the clear and present danger test
initially seems well-suited as a surrogate to the strong presumption against
prior restraints, 72 the Supreme Court never utilized the clear and present
danger test in a prior restraint case. 73 The fact that the Court did not apply
70. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (applying
clear and present danger test to restriction on publication of information relating to ongoing
judicial investigation); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (applying clear and present
danger test to restrictions on speech which advocates criminal activity); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941) (applying clear and present danger to restrictions on judicial criticism).
The prototypical standard for review of restrictions of expression in many First Amendment
contexts is the clear and present danger test. The test allowed for the restriction of speech if
"the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919). While Schenck did not involve a prior restraint, Schenck is important as the origin
of Holmes' articulation of the clear and present danger standard. Id. See also Frank R. Strong,
Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger".From Schenck to Brandenburgand Beyond, 1969
Sup. CT. REv. 41, 44 (recognizing that importance of Schenck stems from first appearance of
Holmes' test).
71. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 , 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating potent formulation of clear and present danger test); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 371-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating invigorated articulation of clear and
present danger test). See Strong, supra note 70, at 46-47 (discussing Holmes-Brandeis potent
articulation of clear and present danger test).
72. See Strong, supra note 70, at 46-47 (discussing evolution of clear and present danger
test after Schenck). The clear and present danger test is an amorphous formulation that courts
have applied in a variety of ways. See generally id.
73. But see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (stating Dennis
formulation of clear and present danger test). While the Court in Nebraska Press did invoke
the Dennis formulation of the clear and present danger test, many commentators have denied
that this formulation is really a version of the clear and present danger test because of the
formulation's abandonment of an imminence requirement. See infra note 82 and accompanying
text (describing critics' reactions to Dennis formula). While the Court in Nebraska Press did
rely on the prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy, the Court did not hinge its
analysis on the distinction between the two types of restraints and instead, formulated a
balancing test to weigh the competing interests of free press and fair trial. Nebraska Press,
427 U.S. at 562.
The Court's hollow invocation of the prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy
and creation of a balancing test seem to reflect the modern Court's increased confidence in
balancing. See Aleinikoff, supra note 68, at 963-72 (discussing increased use of balancing in
the twentieth century). Aleinikoff states that the Court has increasingly relied on balancing
formulations, such as the clear and present danger test, during the twentieth century. Id. at
964 (noting that during balancing approach's formative years, Supreme Court never considered
balancing exclusive method of constitutional interpretation). While both the categorical and
balancing tests continue to exist concurrently, ad hoc balancing gradually has superseded
categorical analysis. Id. The author also notes that Oliver Wendell Holmes, the author of the
clear and present danger test, was one of the leading academic proponents of balancing. Id.
at 955.
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the clear and present danger test in early press cases, such as Near,74 may
be due to the Court's satisfaction with a categorical approach, which in
many ways resembles the Abrams-Whitney version of the clear and present
danger test applicable at the time of these cases. While not used for the

review of prior restraints, the Supreme Court did use the clear and present
danger formula as a strict scrutiny balancing test s appropriate for the review
76
of prior restraint's less suspect, fraternal twin, subsequent punishment.
The Court relies consistently on the clear and present danger test's two
components, seriousness and imminence, to gauge the constitutionality of
subsequent punishments on the press.77 Courts have also applied the clear

and present danger test to other cases relating to restrictions on the press,
including the attempted restraint of the press' right to publish commentary

critical of judges. 7 Given this wide application, the clear and present danger
test might seem ideally suited for widespread use in the free press context;
however, members of the Court have been dissatisfied with the test for

different reasons. 79 Much of this dissatisfaction crystalized in Dennis v.
United States,8° in which the Court distorted the clear and present danger

74. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
75. See Strong, supra note 70, at 54-55 (describing changing use of test).
76. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (reviewing application of clear and present
danger test to subsequent punishments). Contra Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1461 (labelling
Nebraska Press test clear and present danger test and noting its application to prior restraints).
Id.
77. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (reversing
conviction under statute because it could not satisfy constitutional standards announced in
Landmark); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978) (questioning
relevance of clear and present danger test before applying it to subsequent punishment).
Although the Burger Court initiated its analysis in Landmark by calling into question the
relevance of the clear and present danger test, the Court relied on the test to invalidate a
Virginia statute that penalized the dissemination of information relating to confidential judicial
investigations. Id. at 845. Cf. Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1461 (noting that Landmark Court
applied clear and present danger test). But see Schauer, supra note 48, at 7 n.62 (arguing that
"no canonical formulation" of prior restraint standard exists).
78. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 382 (1962) (applying clear and present danger
test to restrictions on speech critical of judges); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375 (1947)
(same); Pennikamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946) (same); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (same).
79.
See Strong, supra note 70, at 53 (stating that, after Dennis, clear and present danger test
became "largely or wholly unsatisfactory because [it was] either too virile or overly weak").
80. United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Supreme Court in Dennis reviewed
the conviction of Eugene Dennis and several other alleged communists who the government
accused of advocating the overthrow of the government in violation of the Smith Act. Id. at
499. The Court held that the Smith Act was not facially invalid under the First Amendment's
free speech and free press guarantees because the Act penalized advocacy and not mere
discussion. Id. at 502. The Court approved the formulation of the clear and present danger
announced by the lower court judge, Learned Hand, that abandoned the clear and present
danger test's imminence component. Id. at 510. The Court applied this formulation and upheld
the convictions of all the defendants. Id. at 510-16.
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test beyond recognition by abandoning the test's imminence requirement.,
Commentators have extensively criticized the Dennis test because of its
failure to adequately protect First Amendment interests,8 2 and many do not
consider the Dennis test to be a form of the clear and present danger test
because of its less exacting scrutiny. 3 The Supreme Court eventually abandoned the Dennis formula in Brandenburg v. Ohio,8 4 causing analysts to
find agreement in the Court with this criticism of the weakened Dennis
formula.85 While some commentators have suggested that Brandenburg
symbolized the revival of the strongly protective clear and present danger
test, 6 the Supreme Court used the test less frequently after Brandenburg as

81. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (stating clear and present danger formula without
imminence requirement). After Dennis, the Court continued to employ the clear and present
danger test with the imminence requirement intact in other contexts to provide strict standard
of review. See Wood, 370 U.S. at 383 (applying pre-Dennis formulation in contempt of court
controversy); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (applying pre-Dennis test to content restriction on motion picture); see
also Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1456 n.20 (stating that Court continued to use strong
formulation of clear and present danger test, with imminence component intact, under Dennis
regime).
82. See Schmidt, supra note 54, at 459-66 (noting inconsistency of Dennis balancing
approach and prior restraint doctrine). Schmidt notes that the Dennis Court advanced Learned
Hand's test not to evaluate the validity of a prior restraint but to determine the validity of a
subsequent punishment. Id. Schmidt further points out that the choice of a standard applied
previously only to subsequent punishments is odd in light of Judge Hand's emphatic differentiation between the disparate interests implicated by prior restraints and subsequent punishments. Id. More notably, Schmidt has joined other commentators in criticizing the test as
amorphous. Id.; see, e.g., Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1457 (noting that Dennis convinced First
Amendment scholars that clear and present danger test was either dead or no longer capable
of adequately protecting speech interests); Paul Freund, The Great Disorder of Speech, 44
AM. SCHOLAR 541, 545 (1975) (describing Dennis test as sliding scale). But see Joel H. Swift,
Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal Jury Cases, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 45, 54 [hereinafter
DEFENSE PUBLIcIrY] (noting that there are reasonable explanations for Nebraska Press Court's
use of Hand formula).
83. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor,the Press,and Free Speech, 58 FoRDHAm
L. REV. 865, 927 n.382 (1990) (describing Burger's use of Dennis test as doctrinal aberration);
David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1207, 1349-50 (1983) (noting that Dennis marked both apex and turning point of reliance on
danger test'because phrase could no longer bear pressure of inconsistent interpretations).
84. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
85. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 451 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(acknowledging departure from Dennis clear and present danger test). The Court in Brandenburg quietly reintroduced the imminence component into its formula and added an intent
formula that resulted in the most protective version of the clear and present danger standard
since the Holmes-Brandeis application. Id. at 447. See Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1456-57
(discussing evolution of clear and present danger test). However, not all members of the Court
allowed the Dennis formulation to pass quietly. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (describing Dennis test as distorting, twisting, and perverting clear and present
danger test). After Brandenburg many critics echoed Justice Douglas' calls for abandoning the
test. See Strong, supra note 70, at 43-44 (noting commentators repudiation of test as weak
and of no assistance).
86. See Louis S. Ravenson, Advocacy & Contempt: ConstitutionalLimitations on the
Judicial Contempt Power, 65 WASH. L. REv. 477, 510 n.13 (1990) (stating that Brandenburg
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a standard of review due to these misgivings .

7

After Brandenburg, the Supreme Court hesitantly applied the clear and

present danger test as the standard of review in several cases involving
subsequent punishments." Additionally, some members of the Court attempted to incorporate the test into prior restraint analysis.8 9 For example,
Justice Stewart's opinion in New York Times, with which two other Justices

concurred, advocated applying a variation of the test. 90 In addition to
Justice Stewart's use of the test, some commentators have equated the threepronged test set forth in Nebraska Press with the clear and present danger
test. 9' The continued appearance of the test may be explained, in part,
because of the Court's inability to identify another test that imposes the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment and that is adaptable to
the free press context. While few members of the Supreme Court believe
that either the clear and present danger test or the prior restraint-subsequent

punishment dichotomy can accurately serve as a constitutional test, none
of the Justices has been able to create a constitutional test acceptable to a
majority of the Court. The question that remains is whether any underlying
principle of Press Clause jurisprudence exists that can effectively guide
future free press cases.
is primary articulation of modem clear and present danger test). But see Rabban, supra note
83, at 1351 (noting that Brandenburg standard remains uncertain and that, because standard
was neither accompanied by serious analysis nor necessary to resolution of case, Supreme
Court may not have intended to create new formulation of test).
87. Cf. Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1464 n.85 (suggesting possibility that Brandenburg
narrowed test's application). Hentoff argues persuasively that Brandenburgmay have narrowed
the test's ambit by emphasizing the test's applicability to advocacy of law breaking. Id. Many
other commentators have suggested that the Court made narrow use of the clear and present
danger test after Brandenburg. See Rabban, supra note 83, at 1352 (questioning whether
Brandenburgtest can ever be applied outside of advocacy context); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HAgv. L.
Rzv. 1, 8 (1965) (recognizing clear and present danger test's limited utility for contempt and
subversive action controversies).
88. See Landmark Communications Co. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (holding
that statute did not satisfy clear and present danger test); cf. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979) (holding that statute did not satisfy constitutional standards
established in Landmark).
89. See infra note 90 (noting Justices Stewart's, White's and Brennan's approval of clear
and present danger test in New York Times).
90. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring,
joined by White, J.), 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (1971) (alluding to clear and present
danger formulations). Both Justices White's and Stewart's opinions rely directly on language
extracted from previous formulations of the clear and present danger test. Justice Stewart
alluded to the test when he determined that disclosure of the the Pentagon Papers would not
"surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." Id.
at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Brennan states that "only government
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can
support the issuance of an interim restraining order." Id. at 726-27.
91. See Bernard James, Justices Still Seeking a Consistent Voice on First Amendment,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 54 (recognizing Nebraska Press use of clear and present danger
test).
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One principle that underlies First Amendment jurisprudence and that
appears capable of satisfying a consensus of the Supreme Court members
is the Court's adherence to strict judicial scrutiny for the review of any
speech restiction imposed on the press. 92 Both the prior restraint-subsequent
punishment dichotomy and the clear and present danger test employ exacting
judicial scrutiny by requiring both a compelling state interest and that the

statute be narrowly tailored. 9 For example, in Nebraska Press, although
the Court cited to the Dennis formulation, the Court's three-pronged test
more closely resembles strict scrutiny review than the emasculated, intermediate scrutiny embodied in the Dennis standard. 94 The Supreme Court's
use of the Hand formula demonstrates the Court's determination to return
to a balancing approach and to forsake the categorical approach embodied

in the prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy. 95 Additionally, the

92. Cf. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.05(B)(4)-2-39 (acknowledging need for threat to be
imminent and substantial to satisfy exacting scrutiny and including Brandenburgin discussion
of strict scrutiny standard). Both the clear and present danger test and ad hoc balancing can
be applied using a strict scrutiny standard. See Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REv. 1003, 1014 (1984)
[hereinafter Unconstitutional Regulation] (discussing use of strict scrutiny standard). The
Supreme Court's reliance on strict scrutiny has been especially evident in context of restrictions
on the media's access to judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 478
U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (applying strict scrutiny review); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S.
501, 510 (1984) (same); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (same); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (same).
93. See NWaMER, supra note 24, § 2.05(B)-2-39-40 (discussing need to demonstrate that
speech is regulated in least restrictive manner, that threatened harm is imminent and grave,
and that state interest is compelling). The prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy
required such exacting judicial scrutiny that a prior restraint would only be approved in the
most compelling circumstances. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(describing that narrow exception to prohibition on prior restraints is limited to national
security); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that prior restraints could only
be allowed in narrowest of circumstances, such as when speech threatens nation's military
security or involves incitements to acts of violence). This need for the state's interest in
restricting speech to be extremely important, and in the case of clear and present danger also
imminent, is the equivalent of the compelling state interest requirement of strict scrutiny.
94. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (establishing threepronged test). There seems to be much confusion concerning what type of test the Supreme
Court employed in Nebraska Press. Various commentators have labelled the Nebraska Press
three-pronged test as a strict scrutiny test. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note
92, at 1014-15 (stating that Nebraska Press employed strict scrutiny, clear and present danger
test); Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1461 (stating that Nebraska Press used Dennis version of
clear and present danger test); NMR, supra note 24, (describing Nebraska Press' use of ad
hoc balancing). This author describes the test as one employing the strict scrutiny standard of
review through ad hoc balancing. See also Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. and Ian D. Volner,
Nebraska Press Association:An Open and Shut Decision, 29 STAN. L. REv. 529, 536-37 (1977)
(equating Nebraska Press standard with serious and imminent threat standard). The Nebraska
Press test contained the requirements of strict scrutiny review, including precision, means-end
nexus, and least restrictive alternative inquiry. Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note
96, at 1028.
95. See Schmidt, supra note 54, at 464 (discussing Court 's use of ad hoc balancing).
But see Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 595 n.21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that Court's
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Court's creation of a three-pronged test that contains the narrowly tailored
requirements demonstrates the Court's commitment to strict scrutiny review.
While the utility of the Nebraska Press approach seems limited to the fair
trial-free press context, courts could apply the test to other types of free

press cases. Absent the creation of another First Amendment litmus test,
an underlying, though often neglected, theme of modern free press analysis
is the requirement of strict judicial scrutiny of any abridgement of the

media's constitutional rights. This requirement of strict scrutiny review is
consistent with free speech jurisprudence that demands strict scrutiny of all
speech restrictions, except those that regulate "low-value" speech. 96

Although the Supreme Court has required strict judicial scrutiny of any
prior restraints on the press, the Court has not addressed the question of
whether exacting scrutiny is appropriate for participant-directed gag orders
which constitute an indirect restraint on the press. 97 The Court has repeatedly

language does not sanction ad hoc balancing). The ramifications of choosing an ad hoc balance
to preserve the guarantee of free press are substantial. For example, the use of ad hoc balancing
will inevitably, given a determination that a real threat exists, hinge largely on the Court's
assessment of the facts and corresponding value judgement in each particular case. See NnaMER,
supra note 24, § 2.05(B)-2-29 (noting that both definitional and ad hoc balancing eventually
requires court to make value judgment). However, the Supreme Court appears to have resolved
indirectly the question of whether the Sixth Amendment right to fair trial may trump the First
Amendment right of freedom of the press in a direct and unavoidable conflict. See Nebraska
Press, 427 U.S. at 569-70 (suggesting that First Amendment would yield to Sixth Amendment
if true conflict existed). The mere accommodation, however narrowly, of the Sixth Amendment
by the First Amendment suggests that the Sixth Amendment does hold a preferred spot in the
Bill of Rights. See Mark R. Stabile, Comment, Free Press-FairTrial: Can They Be Reconciled
in a Highly Publicized CriminalCase?, 79 GEo. L.J. 337, 357 (1990) (suggesting accommodation
of seemingly competing Sixth and First Amendment values); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 539 (1965) (holding that paramount concern for court must be preservation of trial
integrity and that defendant's life or liberty may not be jeopardized by media actions).
Therefore, when applying the Nebraska Press test, the only determination that a court must
ultimately make is whether there is an actual conflict between the competing interests. The
requirements of strict scrutiny review assist a court in making this determination.
96. See Hentoff, supra note 54, at 1464-65 (discussing Burger Court's development of
low-value speech doctrine). The Court has used the low-value doctrine to deny full constitutional
protection to commercial and obscene speech and may be relying implicitly on the doctrine in
denying attorney speech full protection. Id. See generally Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech,
83 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (1989) (discussing low-value doctrine).
97. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (describing Court's failure to grant
certiorari to indirect restraint controversy). Participant-directed gag orders are judicial injunctions which seek to restrain the speech of any trial participant, ie. lawyers, witnesses or other
parties to litigation, for the purpose of preventing communication between the gagged participant and the media. See Todd, supra note 53, at 1172-73 (describing participant-directed gag
orders). Such communication could threaten either the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial or the more general right of the state to protect the integrity of the trial process.
Gag orders directed at any trial participants will hereafter be referred to as participant-directed
gag orders or indirect restraints. The term indirect restraints reflects the author's belief that
the sole purpose of these injunctions is to prevent the press' publication of arguably prejudicial
information, thus achieving indirectly what a court can not achieve directly by means of a
prior restraint. Cf. NBOErt, supra note 24, § 4.08-4-33-34 (referring to indirect abridgement
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denied certiorari in cases that involve indirect restraints, leading to inconsistency in state and federal courts' treatment of indirect restraints. 9 Some
courts consider the indirect restraints to be de facto prior restraints on the
press that require strict scrutiny. 99 Other courts treat the indirect restraints
as restrictions on speech entailing negligible effects on media freedom and
requiring only intermediate scrutiny. 100 While courts have made convincing
arguments for either approach, the key to determining which approach is
more accurate lies in the legal origin of indirect restraints.
B.

Indirect Restraints on the Media

The origin of participant-directed gag orders can be tied exclusively to

a trail of obiter dicta beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Sheppard v. Maxwell.' 0' In Sheppard, the Supreme Court reviewed a habeas
corpus proceeding by a convicted murderer who claimed that the publicity
surrounding his trial had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair

of freedom of speech). Some commentators have referred to these restrictions as prior restraints,
rejecting any differentiation between injunctions on the media and private citizens. See Swift,
Defense Publicity, supra note 54, at 70-71 (rejecting distinction between injunctions on media
and on speakers' communications with media).
98. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (describing inconsistency in federal courts'
treatment of gag orders).
99. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's analysis in
CBS).
100. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's analysis
in Dow Jones).
101. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). This trail of obiter dicta primarily consists of four Supreme
Court cases, each of which relies on the original dicta asserted by the Sheppard Court. See
infra note 104 and accompanying text (labelling Sheppard dicta). Nebraska Press was the
second link in the chain; the Court cited to Sheppard's suggestion that restrictions on trial
participants were probably a constitutionally acceptable means of protecting a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to fair trial. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 553-54
(1976). The Supreme Court never diluted the Sheppard dicta after Nebraska Press and lower
courts have relied heavily on the dicta. Stabile, supra note 95, at 348. The third link in the
chain is Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978). In Landmark, the
Court rejected the application of a subsequent punishment to nonparticipants in a confidential
judicial investigation for the dissemination of information. Id. at 845-46. The Court stated,
in dicta, that the state had more reliable means of securing confidential information and, in
support of this contention, cited to the Sheppard dicta embraced in Nebraska Press. Id. at
837, 845 n.12. The final link in the obiter dicta trail is Gentile, where the Court held that
attorney's speech could constitutionally be subjected to more regulation than the average
citizen's. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991). This effectively
resolves the question, left unanswered by the Court in Nebraska and dodged by the Court for
many years, whether trial-participant gag orders can be constitutionally imposed. See infra
note 309 and accompanying text (evaluating constitutional requirements applicable to indirect
restraints). However, the resolution seems highly questionable given the lack of precedent for
the holding and the Court's evasive reasoning. Gentile, 111 S.Ct. at 2741-45 (reasoning that
precedent supports imposition of speech restraints on trial participants but failing to substantiate
this conclusion besides cursory reference to dicta).
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trial. 02 The Supreme Court held that the inordinate publicity surrounding
the case had violated Sheppard's Sixth Amendment right and ordered the
release of Sheppard unless the state granted him a new trial. 03 In what
later commentators universally acknowledged as dictum, 104 the Court recognized the constitutional possibility of restraining trial participants' speech
in order to ensure a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair trial.105
If the door to indirect restraints was partially opened by Sheppard,
Nebraska Press marked the official first step through the door. Both the
majority and dissent in Nebraska Press were willing to exclude restrictions
on trial participants from the protection of the prior restraint doctrine. 106
Nebraska Press thereby established the central dichotomy in prior restraint
analysis.10 While injunctions that limited the press' freedom to publish
information were impermissible, courts could gag the press' sources if an

102. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966). Sheppard argued that the publicitymarred trial environment made it impossible for him to gain a fair trial with an unbiased
jury. Id.
103. Id. at 363.
104. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 95, at 342 (describing Sheppard dicta); Swift, Defense
Publicity, supra note 82, at 51 (same); Max D. Stem, The Right. of the Accused to a Public
Defense, 18 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 53, 84 (1983) (same); Freedman & Starwood, supra
note 58, at 610-11 (same).
105. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, concluded that
the trial judge should resort to several means to relieve the effects of prejudicial publicity on
the defendant's right to fair trial. Id. at 363. Justice Clark further stated that if none of these
alternatives would prove effective in preserving a defendant's right to a fair trial, the trial
judge could proscribe extrajudicial statements by any trial participant who had divulged
prejudicial matters. Id. at 361. Justice Clark instructed courts to take steps to protect the
judicial processes from prejudice by regulating the actions of all partipants in the judicial
processes. Id.
106. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See Freedman & Starwood,
supra note 58, at 607, 610 (pointing out that Court's opinions in both Sheppard and Nebraska
Press that approved of restrictions on defendants and attorneys were dicta). Nebraska Press'
approval of the use of alternative means short of a prior restraint, as well as the explicit
approval of gag orders in a leading concurrence, surreptitiously transposed the Shepparddictum
into law. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564. Chief Justice Burger implied that indirect restraints
would be a constitutionally valid alternative to prior restraints. Id. at 564 n.8. Chief Justice
Burger noted that the Court has outlined other measures short of prior restraints on publication
tending to blunt the impact of pretrial publicity, one of which was the use of indirect restraints.
Id. at 563-64. Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, explicitly
approved of gag orders. Id. at 572. Brennan stated that "judges may stem the flow of
prejudicial publicity at its source, before it is obtained by representatives of the press." Id. at
601. In a footnote, Brennan stated that a majority of prejudicial publicity could be traced to
the public commentary of law enforcement officials, court personnel and attorneys involved
in the case. Id. at 601 n.27. Justice Brennan reasoned that trial participants have a fiduciary
duty not to engage in commentary that will prejudice the judicial processes. Id. Further, the
courts have the power to regulate the speech of these individuals by using the court's disciplinary
powers. Id.
107. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 539. In opening the door to indirect restraints on
individuals, while invalidating those same restraints on the press, the Court has adopted an
approach previously argued by Justice Stewart in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(examining state prison regulation restricting media access to prisoners).
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important state interest mandated such restrictions.0 8 Courts thereby could
use indirect restraints to achieve the same result as a prior restraint: control
of the dissemination of information to the public.'09 This seeming inconsistency is largely the result of courts' reliance on a highly formalistic understanding of prior restraints." 0 While commentators generally considered
Nebraska Press to be a victory for the media because of its reaffirmation
of the invalidity of prior restraints on the press,' Nebraska Press ironically
provided trial judges with an alternative means to do indirectly, through
participant-directed gag orders, what they could not do directly, through
the use of prior restraints." 2 Nebraska Press' approval of indirect restraints
raised several questions that the Court left unanswered, such as when indirect
restraints would be a constitutionally appropriate means to control extensive
publicity."'
Although courts did not commonly employ indirect restraints prior to
Nebraska Press,"4 trial judges responded to Nebraska Press' lesson and
108. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 539.
109. Id.
110. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing formalistic approach to
First Amendment analysis).
111. See Goodale, supra note 56, at 513 (stating that Nebraska Press is "extremely
important victory" for press); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press
Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN.
L. REv. 515, 528 (1977) (determining that media should embrace Nebraska Press decision);
see also JOHN LOFrON, THE PREss As GuARDIANs OF THE FUST AMENDMENT 271 (1980) (stating
that all of twenty-two papers whose editorials were reprinted in Editorials on File applauded
Nebraska Press decision as victory).
112. Cf. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring). Whereas under
Near, prior restraints were held to violate the First Amendment, a judge could achieve the
same results, stopping the dissemination of information, by enjoining trial participants discussion of the case with the press. See JOHN J. WATKINS, THE MAss MEDIA AND THE LAW 275
(1990) (stating that after Nebraska Press, judges attempted to do indirectly what they could
not have done directly, by issuing gag orders on trial participants). By enjoining the trial
participants, the judge may deny the press valuable information that it would have published,
without actually enjoining publication. Id.; see also Schmidt and Volner, supra note 94, at
470 (pointing out that although Nebraska Press liberated press from direct suppression, Court
offered an alternative method of acheiving the same end by imposing gags on press sources);
Freedman & Starwood, supra note 58, at 607-13, 618 (stating that Court's members in Nebraska
Press denounced prior restraints but then overlooked applicability of all their arguments to
indirect restraints).
113. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing media challenges to indirect
restraints). The Court left at least three questions unanswered in Nebraska Press. First, the
Court failed to explain why indirect restraints are legitimate if in fact they achieve the same
suspect end, preventing the press from publishing information. Second, the Court did not
address the question, that if gag orders are a constitutionally valid alternative to prior restraints
on the press, at what point does an indirect restraint become so restrictive that it would
become constitutionally questionable. Finally, the Court also failed to answer whether, if
indirect restraints limit the press' access to information and ability to gather news, the media
has standing to sue for removal of an indirect prior restraint on a third party trial participant.
While the first two questions remain largely unresolved, lower courts have been fairly uniform
in their answer to the third question. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text (discussing
whether media has standing to challenge indirect restraints imposed on trial participants).
114. See generally CBS Inc., v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (reviewing restraint
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began to use indirect restraints with increasing frequency." 5 In using indirect
restraints, however, courts fashioned different tests in an attempt to determine when resort to indirect restraints was tolerable; this led to significant
division over the appropriate constitutional standard of review for indirect
restraints." 6 For example, several federal courts of appeals are split on
whether indirect restraints require the higher standard of a clear and present
danger or a more deferential standard." 7 Much of this analytical disparity

of all participants in litigation-parties, attorneys, relatives, close friends, and associatesfrom discussing cases with members of news media or public); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d
1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (reviewing indirect restraint imposed on defendants and defense counsel);
United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969);
United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 673 (Md. 1975) (denying government motion for gag
order on trial participants); United States v. Anderson, 356 F. Supp. 1311 (D. N.J. 1973)
(ordering all participants to refrain from extrajudicial comment); State ex rel. Miami Herald
Publ. Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977) (reviewing lower court's indirect restraint);
State v. Carter, 363 A.2d 366 (N.J. 1976) (same); People v. Dupree, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (same); Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d. 138 (1973) (same); People v. Watson,
15 Cal. App. 3d. 28 (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 961 (1971);
Hamilton v. Mun. Ct., 270 Cal. App. 2d 797 (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
According to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, courts issued approximately
174 judicial gag orders between 1967 and 1975 with the number increasing each year. Robert
Trager and Harry W. Stonecipher, Gag Orders: An Unresolved Dilemma, 55 JouLrNAnsM
QuARTERmY 231, 231 (1978). This frequent use of gag orders occurred despite the Supreme
Court's advice in Sheppard to use these means of ensuring an impartial jury as a last resort.
See also LoFroN, supra note 111, at 270 (noting overuse of orders despite Sheppard language).
115. See, e.g., KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Sup. Ct., 459 U.S. 1302, 1308 (1983)
(denying application for stay of indirect order); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernhard, 452 U.S. 89, 104
(1981) (same); News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991) (denying
media challenge to indirect restraint for lack of standing); In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d
603 (2d Cir.) (rejecting gag order imposed by court in employment discrimination suit because
record did not show order'was necessary), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) (rejecting media
challenge to indirect restraint); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Ct., 781
F.2d 1443, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that indirect restraint did not infringe media First
Amendment rights); Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 601 (9th Cir.) (granting
gagged participants petition to dissolve indirect restraint because of overbreadth), reh'g denied,
775 F.2d 1054 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); In re Russell 726 F.2d 1007, 1011
(4th Cir.) (denying gagged witness' petition for relief from indirect restraint), cert. denied sub.
noma., 469 U.S. 837 (1984); In re Hakin, 598 F.2d 176, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting indirect
restraint of trial participants); Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 43 (1987)
(granting magazine's challenge to indirect restraint); United States v. Marcano Garcia, 456 F.
Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. P.R. 1978) (ordering indirect restraint to be imposed); KPNX Broadcasting
Co. v. Sup. Ct., 678 P.2d 431, 441 (Ariz. 1984) (denying television station and reporter's
petition for relief from indirect restraint gagging trial participants).
116. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches adopted
by circuit courts of appeals); see also Swartz, supra note 21, at 1414-15 (discussing conflicting
standards for issuing indirect restraints); Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 46 n.4
(same).
117. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of indirect
restraints). Because of the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the controversy over what
standard is constitutionally permissible for the review of indirect restraints, there exists
significant conflict in the Circuit Courts' holdings. The Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeals apply the "reasonable likelihood" standard. See generally Dow
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stems from the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court on this
issue." 8

The Second Circuit's and Sixth Circuit's treatments of indirect restraints
illustrate the disparity that exists in the accepted standards of review."

9

In

In re Dow Jones & Co.,120 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a
more deferential standard of review, the substantial likelihood test, to affirm
a lower court's imposition of an indirect restraint on the press. 21 In Dow
Jones, after a highly publicized investigation and corresponding indictment
of numerous public officials, a federal district judge entered an order
forbidding the trial participants from making extrajudicial comments to the

media.'2 Several news agencies, including Dow Jones & Co., NBC, CBS
and the New York Times, challenged the order as an unconstitutional prior
restraint on the press in violation of Nebraska Press.23 The Second Circuit
considered the news agencies' appeal and held that the order was not a

prior restraint due to its indirect effect.' 24 The court in Dow Jones stated
that the restriction did not prevent the news agencies from publishing, but
instead only prevented the attorneys from speaking to the media during the

trial.1' 2 Because the order was not a prior restraint, the Second Circuit,

Jones, 842 F.2d at 603 (applying reasonable likelihood standard); Russell, 726 F.2d at 1007
(same); Levine, 764 F.2d at 590 (same); Tijerina, 412 F.2d at 661 (same). The Fifth, Sixth
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals apply either the "clear and present danger" or,
equivalent, "serious and imminent" standard. See generallyBernhard, 619 F.2d at 459 (applying
clear and present danger standard); Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 551 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1977)
(same); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); Chase, 435 F.2d at 1059
(same). Other Circuit Courts have either refused to choose between the two standards or have
adopted unique approaches. See News-Journal, 939 F.2d at 1575 (refraining from deciding
applicable standard); Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 99 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(applying Nebraska Press test); In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981)
(recommending sliding scale approach); Hakin, 598 F.2d at 193 (refraining from deciding
applicable standard).
118. The Supreme Court repeatedly has denied certiorari in cases involving gag orders,
displaying its unwillingness to resolve the many questions surrounding the review of gag orders.
See, e.g., Dow Jones, 488 U.S. at 946 (denying certiorari); Levine, 476 U.S. at 1158 (same);
Tijerina, 396 U.S. at 990 (1969) (same). In a dissenting opinion in Dow Jones accompanying
the denial of certiorari, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, acknowledged
the conflicting holdings of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits Courts of Appeals and the resulting
need for the Court to address their conflicting resolutions. Dow Jones, 488 U.S. at 947 (White,
J., dissenting).
119. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); CBS, 522
F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975).
120. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
121. In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946
(1988).
122. Id. at 605. The order prohibited the defendants, defense counsel, the US Attorney,
and any assistants from making any extrajudicial statement concerning the case or from making
any comment that a reasonable person could expect to be communicated to the media. Id. at
605-06.
123. Id. at 606.
124. Id. at 608-09.
125. Id. Although the court admitted that the gag order may have had an effect similar
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applied the more deferential standard and stated that the pertinent question
was whether there was a reasonable likelihood that pretrial publicity would
26
prejudice a fair trial.
Adopting the opposite approach, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
CBS v. Young' 27 struck down a lower court's gag order that failed to satisfy
the clear and present danger standard.1n Relying on the extensive precedent
established by the Supreme Court's invalidation of prior restraints on the
press, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that courts must review prior restraints
with the closest of scrutiny. 129 The court in CBS concluded that this scrutiny
included applying the clear and present danger test, as well as ensuring that
the court narrowly tailored its order and that the court had exhausted all
reasonable alternatives to speech restrictions.3 0 Applying the clear and
present danger test, the Sixth Circuit found that the articles and publicity
surrounding the case were innocuous and that the fair trial threat was
minimal.'3 ' The court held that the order constituted a prior restraint upon
expression. 3 2 While the lower court had not directly enjoined the media
from publishing, the court had effectively eliminated the media's sources
of meaningful information regarding the case."' Consequently, the indirect
restraint impaired the media's constitutionally protected right to gather
34
information on the judicial process.
The different results at which courts have arrived in reviewing indirect
restraints, evidenced by cases such as Dow Jones and CBS, primarily relate
to the courts' varied approaches to prior restraint doctrine.'35 Courts that
reject the application of prior restraint doctrine to participant-directed gag
to a prior restraint, the court stated that the indirect nature of the gag order distinguished it
from a prior restraint on the press. Id.
126. Id. at 611. The lower standard that courts typically apply is the substantial or
reasonable likelihood test. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that reasonable likelihood standard was appropriate standard for imposition of indirect
restraint).
127. 522 F.2d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 1975).
128. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 1975). CBS involved a civil action
arising out of a wrongful death suit brought on behalf of several students who were slain in
the Kent State incident. Id. at 236. In reaction to the extensive publicity surrounding the
litigation, the trial judge had imposed a gag order on all of the trial participants, including
counsel, court personnel, and "all relatives, close friends, and associates" of the parties,
prohibiting any discussion of the case with the press. Id. at 260.
129. Id. at 238.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 240.
132. Id. at 239. While the Sixth Circuit in CBS did not describe the order as a prior
restraint on the press but on freedom of expression, the court dismissed the distinction in its
analysis. Id. The court subjected the order to an identical analysis as that warranted by a
prior restraint. Id. at 239-42.
133. Id. at 239.
134. Id.
135. See Bjork, supra note 32, at 181 (stating that "[r]esolution of the issue of whether
an indirect gag order constitutes a First Amendment infringement of the media's rights turns
on one's perspective of the underlying purpose of the prior restraint doctrine").
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orders rely on a formalistic perspective. 3 6 Courts that reject the more
demanding clear and present danger standard usually stress whom the court
enjoins and distinguish those parties who actually possess information from
those parties who do not.1 7 Because the press does not yet have the
information, the restraint on the trial participant does not directly affect
This formal analysis accurately demonstrates that the order
the press.'
does not prevent the press from publishing, attending the trial, reporting,
or questioning the gagged parties,3 9 and relies heavily on the fact that an
indirect restraint does not literally prevent the press from publishing any
information."40
Alternatively, the realistic approach focuses on the actual effect that
41
the indirect restraint has on the media and dissemination of news.' The
effect of an indirect restraint is that the restriction removes from the press
its most valuable source of information on the judicial system; consequently,
this inability to gather information effectively retrains the press from publishing. 142 The realistic approach is more consistent with the communications
theory, which recognizes that communication is not merely the act of
43
speaking but also the related acts of receiving and disseminating speech.

136. Id. at 181-85 (discussing differences between formalistic and realistic perspectives of
prior restraint doctrine). The formalistic approach relies heavily on form and identifies a prior
restraint as a speech restriction which occurs prior to the expression by judicial injunction.
Id. at 182. Thus, any expression restriction which does not resemble this form is not a prior
restraint and is less constitutionally suspect. Id. However, continued reliance upon this type
of formalism is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's quiet departure from the prior
restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy. See supra note 63 (discussing modern Supreme
Court's reluctance to rely on prior restraint-subsequent punishment dichotomy in Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing, Co.).
137. See Bjork, supra note 32, at 181-85. For an example of formalism see In re Dow
Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). The Court noted
that "there is a fundamental difference between a gag order challenged by the individual
gagged and one challenged by a third party; an order objected to by the former is proper
characterized as a prior restraint, one opposed solely by the latter is not." Id.
138. See Bjork, supra note 32, at 181-85.
139. Id. However, this formal approach is inherently at odds with the marketplace notion
of First Amendment protection because its narrow focus considers only the effect on the
individual desiring to disseminate information. Id. The marketplace theory focuses more on
collective expression and would recognize that indirect restraints illegitimately curtail the free
exchange of valuable information. Id. at 184.
140. Id. See also Stabile, supra note 95, at 346 (stating that indirect restraints do not
directly restrain media or their coverage of courtroom events).
141. See Bjork, supra note 32, at 182-85 (describing realistic perspective of analyzing
indirect restraints). In order to avoid formalism's superficial analysis, the realistic approach
demands that a court consider the practical effect of a restraint, which results in protection
for any speaker whose speech has in fact been suppressed. Id. at 183-84.
142. Id. at 183. Indirect gag orders muzzle a valuable source of information, invariably
preventing the media from gathering information that is necessary to informed reporting. Id.
If the media can not gather enough information to produce an intelligible account of judicial
activity, then courts have effectively silenced the media. Id. The gag order is a poorly disguised
"de facto prior restraint." Id.
143. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
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The realistic perspective also attacks formalistic arguments as defensible
only through the use of straw arguments and semantic distinctions. 144 The
realistic approach instead recognizes that the underlying purpose of a judge
imposing a gag order is the same as a judge imposing a prior restraint-to
prevent the publication of any information that possibly could compromise
45
trial integrity.
While trial participants raise many challenges to participant-directed
trial orders themselves, the media also have standing to challenge these
indirect restraints. 146 Courts typically base the media's interest in contesting
a gag order on either the right to gather news or the right to receive
information. 47 In CBS, for example, the Sixth Circuit based the media's
standing on its First Amendment right to gather news. 48 The court held
that the media's interest does satisfy the traditional two-pronged test for
standing when the media contests a participant-directed gag order. 49 The
media's interest meets the first requirement, a showing of "injury in fact,"
because gag orders injure the media's access to information and, therefore,
cause economic harm. 50 The media's interest also meets the second prong

concurring) (emphasizing that First Amendment protects communication as well as "indispensible conditions of meaningful communication"); NIMMER, supra note 24, § 4.09-4-41 (noting
that freedom to communicate is meaningless shibboleth if its accompanying rights are not
recognized also); William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at S. I. Newhouse Center for Law &
Justice, in 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 173, 177 (Oct. 17 1979) (stating that First Amendment's
protection extends to entire process of gathering and disseminating news). Justice Brennan
states that the First Amendment protects not only self-expression but "also forbids the
government from interfering with the communicative processes through which we citizens
exercise and prepare to exercise our rights of self-government ... the press is not only shielded
when it speaks out, but when it performs all the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather and
disseminate the news." Id. at 176-77.
144. See Bjork, supra note 32, at 182-85 (contrasting realistic approach to formalistic
approach). The formalistic approach focuses on who, the speaker or the publisher, the gag
order literally restrains and on whether the order restrains the act of speech or the act of
publication. Id.
145. Id. at 183. Bjork observes succinctly that "the real and intended casualty of an
indirect gag order is undeniably the press. If the saving distinction turns on whom the order
affects, then the media, as the true victim of such an order, should be saved." Id.
146. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that owner and
operator of television and radio network had standing to challenge indirect restraint because
it affected media's constitutional right to gather news).
147. See EMERsON, SYsTEM, supra note 61, at 463 (noting that the right to gather and to
receive information, the inverse of the right to speak freely, are strands of the more general
right of freedom of expression. Id. See also Bjork, supra note 32, at 185-94 (discussing right
to gather and right to receive information). The author reasons that "[b]y affording a legal
right to know, the recipient of information may assert a first amendment right entirely
independent of the speaker. This concept is of obvious import in the indirect gag order context
where, in the absence of a right to know, the media's right to communicate is arguably derived
from the trial participants' right to speak." Id. at 186.
148. CBS, 522 F.2d at 237-38.
149. Id. at 237-38 (applying standing test announced by Supreme Court in Data Processing
Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
150. Id. at 239.
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of the standing test, that the interest sought to be protected must be
arguably within the zone of interests protected by statute or constitution,
because the First Amendment protects the media's right to gather news."'
Thus, although the court did not impose the gag order directly on the
2
media, the order did affect the media's constitutionally guaranteed rights.1
Other federal and state courts similarly have held that the media may
contest indirect restraints."3 Contrarily, at least one court has held that
gagged trial participants do not have standing to assert the media's right to
gather news.Y14 The same court has held that the media do not have standing
to assert the First Amendment rights of restricted trial participants.'
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether the
media have standing to contest a participant-directed trial order, the Court
156
has held that the media have standing to contest trial-access restrictions.
57
This establishes a rather amorphous set of ground rules for the media.

151. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1975).
152. Id. at 238. The Sixth Circuit stated that the order affected CBS' constitutional right
to gather news. Id.
153. See Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F.Supp. 38, 40 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding
that media has standing to challenge gag order); United States v. Simon, 664 F. Supp. 780,
786 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same), aff'd sub. nom In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); In re Gannett River States Publishing Co. v. Hand, 571
So. 2d 941, 944 (Miss. 1990) (holding that media had standing to contest order restricting
public access); Ex rel. NBC v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d. 1120, 1124 (Ohio 1990)
(holding that media had standing to contest indirect restraint on trial participants). But see
News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991) (denying media standing
to challenge gag order); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States, 781 F.2d 1443, 1448
(9th Cir. 1986) (same).
154. See Levine v. United States, 764 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir.) (holding that restricted
trial participants did not have standing to assert media's interest in unabridged right to gather
news), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
155. See Radio, 781 F.2d at 1445 (holding that news organization did not have standing
to assert free speech rights of restrained party); Simon, 664 F. Supp. at 788 (same).
156. See Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984)
(holding that guarantees of open criminal proceedings apply to voir dire examination); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (holding that, absent overriding
state interest supported by findings, criminal proceedings must be open to public); see also
Todd, supra note 53, at 1194-202 (discussing public right of access to trial).
Arguably, these Supreme Court holdings that acknowledge the media's interest in gathering
news within the courtroom access context support a finding that the media also has a
constitutional interest in gathering news from trial participants. Such an outcome is not
assured, however. If the Court were to adopt a formalistic rationale which focused on the
form of the restriction, the Court could distinguish between the two contexts. In the context
of courtroom access, the media has a right to gather news where it has been expressed publicly.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (holding that criminal
proceedings must be open to public). Yet, in the context of restrictions on trial-participants,
after Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), it appears that the media may
not have a right to gather news which speakers have not yet expressed in public. See supra
notes 136-45 and accompanying text (discussing formalistic and realistic approaches to prior
restraint doctrine).
157. Cf. In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d 124, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
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While the media clearly have access to the criminal process,' once a court
imposes a gag order on trial participants, the media cannot receive information directly from the trial participants and must, instead, rely on the
media's own ability to interpret the information it can glean from the actual
judicial proceedings. This places the modem media in a difficult situation,
forcing them to interpret, without assistance, the highly complicated legal
dialogue that unfolds before them. 15 9 Prior to the adoption of Gentile rules,
the disruption of the communicative process would only have occurred in
limited situations, such as following a specific threat to a defendant's right
to a fair trial. However, with the adoption of Gentile rules, the inability
of the media to interview counsel has become the rule, rather than the
exception.
C.

Codification of the Gag Order-GentileRules

Although still restricting attorneys' speech as participant-directed gag
orders primarily did, the speech restriction in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada's6 is quite different in form from a gag order. This new type of
restriction seeks to regulate attorneys' speech in pending litigation through
the judicial adoption and enforcement of professional disciplinary regulations.16 ' Many state, district and federal courts have adopted rules similar
to the rule at issue in Gentile.'6 The rule that courts usually adopt, in
whole or in large part, is the American Bar Association's Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6 or its forerunner, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-107
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 63 The result of this new formulation is a speech regulation that may more closely resemble a subsequent
punishment than a prior restraint, because the punishment does not occur
until after the expression.
From a First Amendment perspective, therefore, this new formulation
initially seems less dangerous than either indirect restraints or prior restraints
on the press for several reasons. First, a Gentile rule initially appears less
constitutionally suspect than an indirect restraint because, as a system of

requiring reasonable likelihood standard of review for indirect restraints on trial participants
while requiring substantial probability standard to deny press access to public documents
relating to case is logically inconsistent).
158. See supra note 156 (discussing briefly access to criminal process).
159. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note 92, at 1013 (noting media's need
for assistance in interpreting legal events and technicalities).
160. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
161. See supra note 3 (demonstrating example of judicially-enforced bar disciplinary rule
based on Model Rule 3.6).

162. See Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 525-28 (1980) (examining
fair trial-free press controversy). For additional discussion on the American Bar Association
and other groups attempts to resolve the fair trial-free press conflict see Swift, Unconstitutional
Regulation, supra note 92, at 1003-06 (discussing history of Model Rule 3.
163. See Matheson, supra note 83, at 872-77 (describing development of judicially-enforced
disciplinary rules).
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subsequent punishment, the rule seems to avoid many of the negative
attributes condemned by the prior restraint doctrine. 16 As a penalty imposed
subsequent to speech, the chilling effect of a Gentile rule may be less
substantial according to prior restraint doctrine because it assumedly gives
more notice than an indirect restraint gives. 165 Second, because the rule
provides considerable guidelines that set forth what speech is protected or
unprotected, the attorney is forewarned of the type of speech that may be

punishable. 166 The rule provides an attorney with a warning that a court
may punish her speech prior to actual expression, a safeguard absent in
prior restraint and indirect restraint cases. Such a rule, in addition, may
not proscribe' the same quantum of speech in the marketplace of ideas as
proscribed by prior restraints or indirect restraints, since the rule allows

some nonprejudicial information to reach the press and public. 67 Finally,
if the attorney does violate the rule, a court will evaluate her expression
after the threat of prejudice becomes clearly known. Theoretically, the less
hasty review results in a fairer determination of guilt, because a reviewing

court, rather than the court mired in the original controversy, reviews the

speech at issue. 68 In light of these factors, the regulation of attorney speech
through judicial adoption of rules of professional conduct seems especially
appealing.

However, many of the advantages of Gentile rules are, in fact, illusory.
Gentile rules pose unique problems to both the speaker's and the media's

First Amendment rights. One of the most significant problems that this new
type of speech restriction presents is that a Gentile rule chills the overall
169
quantum of speech to a greater extent than would an indirect restraint.
164. See supra notes 61-62 (describing negative attributes of prior restraints). But see
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding Gentile rule
has many similarities to prior restraint because courts can punish both by the judicial contempt
power and neither activates criminal safeguards); Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra
note 92, at 1054 (concluding that Gentile rule is not subsequent punishment but is "particularly
pernicious form of prior censorship").
165. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing negative attributes of prior
restraints). But cf. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248 (noting that Gentile rules can be punished by
contempt power and that full criminal procedural safeguards, including right to jury trial,
would not be available).
166. See Matheson, supra note 83, at 900 (stating that combination of threat of harm
standard with specific statements offers guidance about what lawyers cannot say to press).
167. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (stating that subsequent punishment restricts
overall communication in marketplace less than prior restraint). But see NndmER, supra note
24, § 1.02-1-18 (questioning appropriateness of marketplace metaphor).
168.
See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 52 (discussing inability of judges considering
prior restraint to determine consequences of suppression of speech). But see United States v.
Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting that courts can enforce professional
disciplinary rules with judicial contempt power).
169. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note 96, at 1053 (noting that chilling
effect of Gentile rule is greater than that of prior restraint). The author notes that while a
prior restraint freezes the speech that it prohibits, all other unrestrained speech is declared
implicitly as protected; however Model Rule 3.6 chills all attorney speech and does not offer
a determination of what falls within its scope until after self-censorship has taken its toll. Id.
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Because the Gentile rule applies generally to all pending civil or criminal
litigation, the First Amendment chill is broader than that imposed by a
participant-directed gag order. 170 Any lawyer who has litigation pending will
surely be aware of the rule and its punishments. 171 The rule's threat of
sanction may cause a lawyer to restrict his speech in cases where there is
no substantial likelihood of harm, merely because of the lawyer's fear of
sanction or disbarment. 72 A Gentile rule forces a lawyer to be his own
censor and judge, invariably second-guessing his statements and sacrificing
the power of zealous advocacy. 73 Under such a rule, a court can seek
punishment for an attorney's expression for any supposed infringement,
regardless of the merits of the claimed potential prejudice. 74 Furthermore,
a Gentile rule is imposed categorically, blanketing all forms of litigation

170. See id. (discussing chilling effect of Gentile rule). Swift's analysis also demonstrates
that a Gentile rule chills more speech than an indirect restraint. Id. Whereas an indirect
restraint freezes speech in one particular setting after lengthy judicial determination, a Gentile
rule applies categorically to all cases and chills the speech in these cases regardless of whether
or not a threat of prejudice exists. Id. See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that Gentile rule creates blanket prohibition and that
restriction's breadth is unconstitutional).
171. See infra notes 227-38 and accompanying text (discussing facts at issue in Gentile).
The contention that a Gentile rule entails greater chill than a gag order is borne out by the
facts in Gentile. Id. Gentile consulted and deliberated over Rule 177 prior to his press
conference in an attempt to determine the rule's ambiguous boundaries. Id.
172. See Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra note 92, at 1029 (suggesting that
attorney does not personally gain from publicity and will compromise zealous advocacy when
faced with risk of substantial penalty). See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., First Amendment Peril:
Bad Issues Making Worse Law, N.J.L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 66 (discussing threat Gentile poses
to lawyers). The author concludes that "after Gentile, the bottom line seems to be that ...
any defense lawyer who goes to the press to say his client was framed, or to fight back against
prejudicial pretrial publicity orchestrated by the prosecution, will act at his own peril." Id.
173. See Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra note 92, at 1055 (noting that rule
"presents an almost insurmountable incentive to all but the most courageous of attorneys to
err on the side of silence."). By threatening a defense counsel with sanctions and disbarment,
a Gentile rule decreases the defense counsel's willingness and ability to embrace unrestrained
advocacy. A defense counsel who fears sanctions and does not know what comments will
result in disciplinary action will remain silent in the face of allegations disseminated prior to
indictment by the prosecution. The defense counsel may refrain from her duty to provide a
fair and balanced portrayal of the defendant in the media. See generally Stuart W. Gold,
Litigators and the Press, 13 Lmo. 36 (Winter 1987).
174. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that complaint
filed against Hirschkop with Virginia State Bar alleged only that Hirschkop explained to media
that he represented indicted prison official because official was "a good guy"); see also Bauer,
522 F.2d at 251 (noting broad sweep of Gentile rule). The Seventh Circuit in Bauer also
recognized this potential for overbreadth in enforcement. Id. at 251. The Seventh Circuit also
stated that "these rules establish such a blanket prohibition whereby even a trivial, totally
innocuous statement could be a violation. The First Amendment does not allow this broad a
sweep." Id. The Bauer court also acknowledged that the provisions of the Gentile rule at issue
were overly restrictive. Id. at 252-53. The court noted that the rules would not even allow an
attorney to deny his clients involvement in the charged criminal indictment or to allege abusive
use of the grand jury. Id.
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without the safeguard of an adversary hearing where a75 court can make
individualized determinations of the threat of prejudice.'
A Gentile rule also poses extensive dangers to the media's ability to
communicate meaningful information concerning the judicial system to the
public.' 76 While a Gentile rule's post-expression evaluation appears more
fair to an attorney charged with violating a bar rule, the rule's mere
existence chills an undetermined number of speakers into quiet submission.
The rule stifles a valuable number of potential sources of information on
whom the media rely to interpret the significance of legal developments and
stratagems.' 77 Post-expression evaluation of the speech cannot restore the
free marketplace of ideas, nor can such a rule provide the expedient review
afforded to prior restraints. These negative attributes demonstrate a Gentile

rule's propensity for dramatically reducing the free exchange of information
and the media's ability to gather information. 7 Without an attorney's
assistance and commentary, the media's ability to communicate to the public
becomes compromised and results in the media's inability to perform79 many
of the functions justifying traditional First Amendment protection.'

In addition to these stifling effects on both the speakers' and the
media's communicative abilities, Gentile rules also are inherently vague and
fail to fully equip attorneys with clear guidelines for acceptable speech and

prohibitions on specific types of speech. The Supreme Court's holding in
Gentile that Rule 177 was void-for-vagueness demonstrates that this is the

case. 18 0 At best, any guidelines drafted by a court or bar association can
only cover generalities and will not be able to provide a yardstick capable

175. See NROMSR, supra note 24, § 4.05-4-28 (discussing constitutional requirement of
adversary hearing prior to imposition of prior restraint).
176. See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 74 (noting that indirect restraint is
government interruption of communicative act). Swift states that the situation involved "is
one where the speaker is willing to speak and the press is interested in hearing and publishing
what the speaker has to say, but the government is asserting an interest that in some way
interferes with that otherwise open line of communication and distribution." Id.
177. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note 92, at 1012-14 (discussing value
of attorney insight on pending litigation).
178. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (recognizing value of
media coverage of judicial system). The Supreme Court has not been totally insensitive to the
importance of protecting the media's ability to report about the criminal justice system. Id.
In Nebraska Press, the Court, in considering the danger of prior restraints, noted that the
damage caused by such a restraint is especially troublesome when the restraint curtails the
dissemination of news. Id. The Court stated that it has given the reporting of open judicial
proceedings increased protection in prior cases and that this heightened protection should also
extend to prior restraints on the reporting of criminal proceedings. Id. While these comments
attest to the importance of protecting the media from direct restraint, they may be equally
valid to justify protection of the media from indirect restraints.
179. See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 71-75 (discussing societal interest in
preserving unfettered attorney speech).
180. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991) (declaring safe
harbor provision void for vagueness). See infra note 315 (discussing implications of Court's
rejection of portion of rule as unconstitutionally vague).

19921

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEDIA

of separating protected and unprotected expression.' Also, a Gentile rule,
by punishing the speaker subsequent to expression, creates the false im-

18 2
pression that the expression will be subject to a more level-headed review.

Presumably, a court measures the speaker's culpability by the actual threat

of prejudice, which has either materialized or been proven false. However,
this presumption is not necessarily accurate because most Gentile rules
contain a subjective standard of actual prejudice-the mind of the speaker-

rather than an objective standard." 3 While the reviewing court may find in
retrospect that no actual threat of prejudice existed, the coult will not be
able to take this into account because the rule does not require actual
prejudice. 1' 4

While relatively few courts have considered a Gentile rule's failings or
even addressed the rule's constitutionality, the courts that have examined
such a rule have reached different conclusions as to the desirability of using
a blanket rule to regulate attorney speech. s5 In part, the disparity in these
courts' conclusions results from the question of what level of scrutiny to
adopt, an issue that remains unresolved for both Gentile rules and partici-

181. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.6, cmt. (recognizing difficulty
in striking balance between protecting the right to fair trial and safeguarding right of free
speech).
182. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 61, at 464 (noting strict scrutiny's need to determine
potential for actual prejudice). Emerson, in considering the constitutionality of Gentile rules,
concludes that strict scrutiny demands a determination of the potential for actual prejudice.
Id. He reasons that any restriction on an attorney's speech that is not targeted at comments
engendering specific prejudice in a particular case violates the attorney's right to free speech.
Id.
183. See James, supra note 91, at S4 (stating that substantial likelihood test allows state
to punish statements even if resulting prejudice is unintended or never realized). The reasonable
likelihood test measures whether the speaker knew or should have known the potential threat
resulting from his speech instead of focusing on the actual danger created by the speech. See
supra note 3 (stating Model Rule 3.6 and its substantial likelihood standard).
184. See supra note 3 (stating Model Rule 3.6 and substantial likelihood standard). Because
of the standard's failure to consider the imminence of the harm, the standard in many ways
is similar to the heavily criticized Learned Hand formulation applied in Dennis. The Hand
formula concentrated disproportionately on the gravity of the evil, so that even if the evil was
remote, the independent gravity component could still tip the balance. The substantial likelihood
standard focuses strongly on the speaker's intent, and in doing so, ignores the fact that even
if the threat of prejudice was remote, as demonstrated by the lack of actual prejudice, the
standard would still demand punishment be imposed on the speaker.
185. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) (rejecting facial
challenge to Gentile rule's incorporation of reasonable likelihood standard); Chicago Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975) (invalidating Gentile rule that did not
contain serious and imminent threat standard); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 115 (7th Cir. 1971)
(invalidating Gentile rule that did not require determination of whether attorney comment is,
or even could be, prejudicial); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Mont. 1984) (invalidating
Gentile rule as violative of First Amendment without approving of either reasonable likelihood
or serious and imminent standard); Markfield v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 370
N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (rejecting per se application of Gentile rule to attorney who appeared on
radio talk show during trial because court found there was no showing of clear and present
danger), appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 794 (1975).
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pant-directed gag orders. 18 6 The courts' disparate analyses also result, however, from their different conceptualizations of a Gentile rule and of the
role that an attorney plays in the modern judicial system. 1' A comparison
of Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer8 ' with Hirschkop v. Snead 89 best
exemplifies the different treatment that courts have given to Gentile rules.
In these cases, two Circuit Courts of Appeals subjected the judicially
enforced rules to different standards of review. 19
In Bauer, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an
action in which an association of attorneys and several of its members
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from a Gentile rule that a local
district court had adopted.' 9' The attorneys argued that Model Rule 7-107,
adopted as the local rule, and its "reasonable likelihood of material prejudice" standard were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.192 The attorneys also argued that the Gentile rule violated a lawyer's First Amendment
rights, because courts do not restrict the rule to situations presenting a clear
and present danger of harm to the administration of justice. 193 The plaintiffs
in Bauer conceded that the rule would be constitutional if the rule incorporated the serious and imminent threat standard.' l The plaintiffs posited
the view that fair trials were not even at issue in the case, because the rule
did not limit its regulation to lawyers' comments that actually impaired the
ability of the court to assure fair trials. 95
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis in Bauer by
examining the relationship between the First and Sixth Amendments. 9 6 The
court stated that the two amendments do conflict realistically, and that in
this circumstance, the attorney's First Amendment rights must yield in favor
of the defendant's right to a fair trial. 1 While the court acknowledged that

186. See Keller, 693 P.2d at 1214 (citing three different standards that courts have applied
to Gentile rules and abstaining from stamdard).
187. See supra note 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing whether Gentile rules are
constitutional equivalent of prior restraints).
188. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
189. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
190. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying
serious and imminent harm standard); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979)
(validating reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard).
191. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 247.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1975). The
plaintiffs in Bauer contended that there is no need to balance attorneys' First Amendment
rights against litigants' rights to fair trials, because these two rights do not compete. Id. There
may be considerable support for this argument see infra notes 222, 309 (discussing threat
media publicity poses to defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair trial).
196. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248.
197. Id. The Bauer court missed a logical step in its analysis of the competing interests
of the attorney's and media's First Amendment rights and the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial. While the attorney's First Amendment right to speak must yield when in
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the rule shared some similarities with a prior restraint, 98 the court concluded
that the rule differed from a prior restraint because of its form.199 Because
of these differences in form, the court held against treating the rules as
prior restraints but also stated that, because the rules shared some of the
inherent features of prior restraints, the court would apply strict scrutiny

review. 0
The Seventh Circuit in Bauer stated that constitutional scrutiny of the
rules required both a review based upon the rule's clearness, precision, and
narrowness, and also a determination that the rules be neither vague nor
overbroad. 201 In light of these constitutional standards, the Seventh Circuit
held that the proper test for evaluation of a Gentile rule was the "serious
and imminent threat of interference with the fair administration of.justice." 02 In requiring the higher standard, the Seventh Circuit applied the
same test that courts impose upon prior restraints on the press to indirect
restraints on trial participants. 203 The court in Bauer also stated that the
imposition of the standard itself was not sufficient to ensure constitutional
validity.2 4 While this standard would eliminate overbreadth, courts must
consider the vagueness of each individual provision. 20 Following its own
mandate, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to review each provision of the rule

conflict with defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, the Seventh Circuit failed to
consider whether the First Amendment still loses the balance if the conflicting right at stake
is not the defendant's right to a fair trial but rather the government's general right to preserve
trial integrity. Id. at 248. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a State the right to a fair
trial. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing state's interest in jury impartiality).
The framers did not articulate a governmental right to preserve trial integrity in any specific
constitutional provision. But cf. Matheson, supra note 83, at 883 ("Protecting the integrity of
the adversarial criminal litigation process from external influences is a state concern complementary to but independent of the interest in protecting the individual rights of the accused.").
198. Id. The Bauer court noted that
[a] violation of the rules can be punished by the contempt power just like a failure
to obey an injunction. The full criminal procedural safeguards, including the right
to trial by jury, would not necessarily be available. Punishment by contempt is an
important attribute of "prior restraint" that distinguishes it from a criminal statute
that forbids a certain type of expression.
Id.
199. Id. The rule at issue in Bauer was not a "predetermined judicial prohibition restraining
specified expression" that would be immune to violation if opportunities for appeal existed.
Id. The court rules, on the other hand, could be challenged by one who had violated them.

Id.
200. Id. at 248-49.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 249 (relying on test formulated in Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061-62
(7th Cir. 1970)). Because of the constitutional need for precision and the most narrow
restriction, the Seventh Circuit in Bauer held that the serious and imminent standard was most
consistent with prior Supreme Court holdings. Id. The serious and imminent threat standard
gives an attorney stricter notice and is less restrictive than the amorphous reasonable likelihood
standard. Id.
203. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975).
204. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249-50.
205. Id. at 251.
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at issue and subsequently struck down the rule's applicability to several
areas of the
judiciary2O6 and the rule's prohibition of speech on several
207
subjects.
While the Seventh Circuit in Bauer had held that Gentile rules demanded
the heightened scrutiny of the clear and present danger standard, the Fourth

Circuit arrived at a different conclusion in Hirschkop.20 In Hirschkop the
court considered the constitutionality of a rule based on DR 7-107 that was
similar to the Gentile rule questioned in Bauer.209 After a cursory examination of the threat that prejudice poses to criminal jury trials, 210 the
Hirschkop court determined that the need to preserve a fair jury trial
justifies a properly drawn rule to regulate lawyers' extrajudicial comments
about pending criminal prosecutions. 21' The court concluded that the rule

206. Id. at 253-55. The Bauer court struck down several provisions restricting various
comments, including those relating to the attorney's opinions about the unconstitutionality or
injustice of a statute and about character (particularly supportive statements involving defendant's character). Id. at 253-54.
207. Id. at 255-59.
208. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) (approving of Gentile
rule that incorporated reasonable likelihood standard).
209. Id. at 365. The plaintiff, an attorney, argued that because there was a less restrictive
alternative to the Gentile rule-an indirect restraint-the rule consequently violated his First
Amendment rights. Id.
210. Id. at 365-66. The Fourth Circuit's examination of the threat posed by pretrial
publicity to a fair trial is conclusory because it is contains little factual support. Id. at 365.
The court cites to the same sources repeatedly (ABA, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and
Free Press (1968) and Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the
"Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968)) and relies on dicta from several Supreme
Court decisions (Nebraska Press and Sheppard), which did not even consider the validity of
indirect restraints, much less the validity of Gentile rules. Id. at 364-66. Further, the Fourth
Circuit cited to three cases where. pretrial publicity undermined the defendant's right to fair
trial but fails to acknowledge the score of cases in which courts held that prolific coverage
was insufficient to undermine the defendant's right to fair trial. See infra note 296 (discussing
Supreme Court precedent on threat of publicity to defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair
trial).
The court in Hirschkop rejects the applicability of Virginia's rule to bench trials and civil
trials, solely for lack of evidence. Id. at 372-73. The court could not find sufficient support
that a threat to these proceedings actually exists. Id. But, is the evidence offered to establish
the threat to fair trials in the criminal setting any more convincing? In contrast, there is
substantial evidence to suggest that the threat that media coverage of an attorney's commentary
poses to a fair trial is insignificant. See generally Robert E. Dreschel, An Alternative View of
Media-JudiciaryRelations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free
Press Issue, 18 HorsTRA L. REv. 1 (1989) (analyzing social scientific research on fair trial-free
press controversies and determining that issue is overblown); Simon, supra note 111, at 528
(describing examining abundant empirical evidence and concluding that threat to fair trial is
negligible).
211. Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 367. The Fourth Circuit (while quoting Nebraska Press,
which required a court to find no less restrictive alternatives prior to resorting to speech) fails
to examine alternatives short of a Gentile restraint which would alleviate the threat of prejudice.
In both Sheppard and Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court listed numerous alternatives that
must be explored. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-65. In Hirschkop,
however, the Fourth Circuit fails to explore these options and, therefore, violates the Nebraska
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furthered a substantial state interest. 212

The Fourth Circuit in Hirschkop then focused on the constitutionality
of the standard employed in the rule, the reasonable likelihood of prejudice
standard. 2 3 The court initially reviewed the use of the clear and present
danger standard in prior restraint and judicial criticism cases and found the
standard too strict to protect the judicial processes. 2 4 The court then, also
examined the relationship between the attorney and the court. 2 5 While
216
holding that an attorney did not have diminished First Amendment rights,
the court concluded that an attorney did owe a special duty to the court

and to the jublic.27 This duty required the attorney to protect the courtroom
from extraneous influences that could compromise its fairness and not to
subvert the trial process by intentionally misrepresenting the facts or dis8

21
seminating prejudicial information.
The Hirschkop court noted, however, that the judiciary can only enforce
the attorney's duty if the judiciary has the power to punish an attorney's
failure to live up to this duty.219 The clear and present danger standard
would not allow the court to enforce this duty in some circumstances due
to the necessary showing of actual prejudice.2 0 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit
in Hirschkop could find no basis for the conclusion that the Constitution
mandates the utilization of the tighter standard in the state rule. 2 ' The
court, applying a formalistic approach, dismissed out of hand the contention
that the rule was a prior restraint. 2 Based upon these findings, the Hirschkop court held that the reasonable likelihood of prejudice test was consti-

tutionally acceptable.22

Press standards. Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 370. This requirement of exploring less restrictive
alternatives also would require a court to consider the various types of speech restrictions at
its disposal and to choose the least restrictive one that could mitigate the threat to fair trial.
See infra note 301 and accompanying text (describing less restrictive alternative requirement).
212. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979).
213. Id. at 369.
214. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that the standards based upon the clear and present
dangers test were unable to adequately protect the judicial processes from the extraneous
influence of media publicity that decreased impartiality and objectivity and created an appearance of unfairness. Id. at 365. However, the threat from an appearance of unfairness
hardly seems substantial enough to warrant the abridgement of First Amendment rights.
Moreover, the court failed to provide adequate support for this point, relying only on a brief
reference to Sheppard. Id.
215. See id. at 366 (discussing attorney's duty to court).
216. See id. ("Lawyers have First Amendment rights of free speech. They are not second
class citizens.").
217. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979).
218. Id. at 366.
219. Id. at 368.
220. Id.
221. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 1979).
222. Id. at 368. The Fourth Circuit relied on a highly formalistic approach in determining
that the Gentile rule was a prior restraint and ignored many of the practical effects of such a
rule. Id. at 368-69.
223. Id.
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In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada the United States Supreme Court
agreed to hear the appeal of an attorney disciplined under a rule similar to
that at issue in both Bauer and Hirschkop.224 The Court presumably granted
certiorari to resolve the conflicting holdings of federal and state courts over
what type of standard of review was appropriate for Gentile rules.

II.

GENTLE V. STATE BAR OF NEVADA

The United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity
of a judicially enforced rule regulating attorneys' extrajudicial speech in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.?5 In Gentile, the Supreme Court reviewed
an appeal by a defense attorney, Dominic P. Gentile, whose violation of
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 had been upheld by the Nevada Supreme
Court.226 Rule 177 prohibits extrajudicial speech to the media that a lawyer
knows or reasonably should know would have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.2 7 After analyzing the rule
at length in order to determine the scope of permissible speech, Gentile
held a press conference the day after the state indicted his client on criminal
charges?228 He stated that the evidence presented at trial would demonstrate
his client's innocence.? 9 Gentile also stated that the most likely suspect in
the case was a police detective and that the witnesses testifying against his
client, Sanders, lacked credibility and had dubious motivations for testifying . 0 Approximately six months later, a jury acquitted Sanders of all
23
criminal charges. '
Following the acquittal, the State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint
against Gentile that alleged a violation of Rule 177. 232 After a hearing, the
Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar decided that Gentile's
statements at the press conference had indeed violated the provisions of the
rule and consequently recommended a private reprimand. 231 Gentile appealed
the case to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed the Board's finding
in a per curiam decision.2 14 After a de novo review, the Nevada Supreme
Court found that the Board had met the heightened standard of proof,

224. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
225. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
226. Id. at 2723.
227. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (setting forth provisions of Model Rule 3.6
on which Rule 177 is based).
228. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728. For a more detailed account of Gentile's opening remarks
at the press conference and his answers in response to media questioning see id. at 2736-37
(Appendix A), 2739 (quoting Gentile's responses to questions).
229. Id. at 2728.
230. Id. at 2736-37. During Sanders trial, the Court admitted into evidence before the
jury all of the information stated by Gentile at the press conference. Id.
231. Id. at 2731.
232. Id. at 2723.
233. Id.
234. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 787 P.2d 386, 388 (1990) (affirming Board
decision).
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clear and convincing evidence, that disciplinary matters required. 23 The
court held that Gentile should have reasonably known that his comments
were "substantially likely" to prejudice the proceedings because of the
236
timing of his statements and the evidentiary content that he disclosed.
The court also rejected Gentile's First Amendment challenges for lack of
merit. 237 Gentile subsequently filed a writ of certiorari, which. the Supreme
Court granted."'
The Supreme Court, in a judgment marked by its shifting majority, 239
held that Rule 177, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, was void
for vagueness. 240 However, the Court also held, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the substantial likelihood of material harm
test incorporated in the rule satisfied the First Amendment. 24' Although
Gentile's counsel, as well as several amici, 24 2 argued that the clear and

235. Id. at 387 (relying on In re Miller, 482 P.2d 326, 330 (1947)).
236. Id. The Court concluded that Gentile planned the timing of his comments to have
the maximum impact on the jury venire and included commentary relating to witness' character,
credibility and their criminal records. Id.
237. Id.
238. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 669, 669 (1991) (granting certiorari).
239. See generally Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Ill S. Ct. 2720 (1991). Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and VI (holding that rule is void
for vagueness) which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Id. at 273132, 2736. Justice Kennedy dissented from the Court's holding that the substantial likelihood
standard passed constitutional muster. Id. at 2724-31, 2732-36 (arguing that clear and present
danger standard is appropriate First Amendment test). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I and II (holding that rule's substantial likelihood standard
is constitutional) which Justices Scalia, White, and Souter joined. Id. at 2738-45. Justice
Rehnquist dissented from the Court's holding that Rule 177 was void for vagueness. Id. at
274548 (arguing that rule provided fair notice). Justice O'Connor provided the critical swing
vote for both majorities. Id. at 2748-49.
240. Id. at 2731. In the portion of the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the
Court held that the Nevada Supreme Court's application of Rule 177(3) was void for vagueness
because of its poorly constructed safe harbor provision. Id. The safe harbor provision outlines
several types of statements that are not punishable notwithstanding the prohibition stated in
provisions one and two. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (setting forth provisions of
Model 3.6 on which Rule 177 is based). The Court held that because of the rule's grammatical
structure, absent any clarifying interpretation, the rule did not provide fair notice to those
whose speech it proscribes. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731. The Court stated that a lawyer seeking
to decide what type of speech is proscribed would have to guess at the rule's contours because
of the ambiguous wording of the-rule. Id. The Court found that their conclusion that the rule
failed to give adequate notice was supported by the facts at issue in Gentile; Gentile had read
and studied the rule the night before his press conference and believed that his comments fell
within the rule's safe harbor. Id. at 2732. The Court also stated that the imprecision inherent
in the rule could lead to a real possibility of discriminatory enforcement. Id. The Court in
Gentile noted that the potential for discriminatory enforcement was a genuine concern, where
the target of the regulation is the criminal defense bar which has a professional duty to
challenge routinely the State's actions. Id.
241. Id. at 2745.
242. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, et. al.,
in Support of Petitioner, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Ill S. Ct. 2720 (1990) (No. 891836).
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present danger test was the only appropriate constitutional standard for
regulation of speech, the Court declared that attorney speech was highly
regulable and that the lower standard constituted a permissible balance
between attorneys' First Amendment rights and a state's interest in fair
trials. 243
Chief Justice Rehnquist, relying heavily on the historical regulation of
the admission and discipline of attorneys by the courts, stated that the
practice of the bar is a privilege that is burdened with conditions. 244 The
Gentile Court noted that the Supreme Court had regulated attorneys' speech
inside the courtroom in the past. 245 Similarly, an attorney's conduct outside
the courtroom is subject to restrictions on speech that the court could not
impose on ordinary citizens. 246 The Court stated that these precedents stood
for the larger proposition that the speech of trial participants, especially
lawyers, is more regulable than the speech of nonparticipants. 247 The Court
supported this proposition by referring to its decision in Seattle Times v.
Rhinehart,248 where the Court stated that it may subordinate litigants' First
249
Amendment rights to other concerns that arise in the judicial setting.

243. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
244. Id. at 2740 (quoting Justice Cardozo in In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917)).
245. Id. at 2743.

246. Id. (citing ability of courts to sanction attorneys for criticism of judges). The Court
further supported the regulation of an attorney's speech by pointing out that the Court has
regulated attorneys' First Amendment right to solicit business and advertise. Id. at 2744 (citing
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding
that regulation of attorney advertising that is misleading is constitutionally permissible), Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (same), reh'g denied, 443 U.S. 881 (1977), and Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (holding that regulation of attorney's commercial
solicitation did not violate First Amendment), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978)).
247. Id. at 2743-44.
248. 467 U.S. 20 (1984). In Seattle Times the Supreme Court considered a lower court's
protective order that prohibited a newspaper from publishing information obtained exclusively
through court-ordered discovery in litigation in which the newspaper was involved as a party.
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 20. In considering the constitutionality of the order,
the Court stated that the relevant inquiry was whether the regulation at issue furthers an
important state interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and whether the restriction
of First Amendment rights is no greater than is necessary for the protection of the state
interest. Id. at 31. The Court stated that the state's interest in protecting against abuse of its
judicial processes was substantial. Id. at 34. The Court also noted that a litigant has no First
Amendment right of access to information gained solely because of his status as a litigant.
Id. at 32. Further, the Court added that continued court control over discovered information
does not involve the same type of censorship that offends the First Amendment and that a
protective order is not a classic prior restraint. Id. at 32-33. The Court in Seattle Times noted
that heightened scrutiny of this type of order was not required by the First Amendment. Id.
at 36. Therefore, the Court held that where a protective order is entered on a showing of
good cause, is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the
dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First
Amendment. Id. at 37.
249. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744. Justice Rehnquist cites to a footnote in Seattle Times
in order to support his contention that the Court has previously approved of the restriction
on the communication of trial participants. Id. The footnote in Seattle Times to which
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In Gentile, the Court adopted the Seattle Times balancing approach
that required a court reviewing a protective injunction to balance the
substantial government interest against the individual's First Amendment
rightsY 0 The Gentile Court's adoption of a more deferential balancing test
demonstrates the Court's belief that an attorney's speech is more regulable
than that of the ordinary citizen. 251 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority in Gentile, rejected the plaintiff's contention that the standard
applied in Nebraska Press to restraints on the press should also be applied
to a restraint on an attorney's speech relating to pending litigation. 2 2 In
justifying the lower standard, Rehnquist noted that attorneys have a fidu-

Rehnquist cites states that "on several occasions [we have] approved restriction on the
communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal
defendant." Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 n.18. However, the footnote is factually incorrect
in that it cites to four cases in which the Supreme Court did not ratify speech restrictions
directed at trial-participants. Id. The Seattle Times note relies on Nebraska Press, Oklahoma
Press, Sheppard and Gulf Oil v. Bernhard. Id. In none of these cases did the Court approve
speech restrictions imposed on a trial participants. In Nebraska Press, while the majority
opinion did not expressly approve of the use of injunction aimed at trial participants, in a
concurring opinion, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, Justice Brennan stated that these
injunctions would be an acceptable way of ensuring defendant's right to fair trial if Nebraska
Press' three-pronged test was met. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 604 n.27 (considering
lower court's prior restraint on press). See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing
Nebraska Press dicta). In Oklahoma Press the Court rejected a lower court's restriction on
publication of a juvenile's name and picture after noting that the speech restrictions that the
court imposed on counsel were not at issue. See Oklahoma Press, 430 U.S. at 310 n.1, 312
(stating that gagged participants did not contest indirect restraints and rejecting contention
that indirect restraints were prior restraint on press). In Sheppard, a habeas corpus proceeding,
the Court did not consider the validity of participant speech restrictions and mentioned in
dicta that the restriction against counsel might be permissible. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
at 361 (suggesting potential of gagging trial participants). Finally, in Gulf Oil the Court rejected
a gag order imposed by a lower court because there was no basis for finding the order
necessary. See Gulf Oil v. Bernhard, 452 U.S. at 103 (holding that imposition of order was
abuse of discretion).
250. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (employing balancing
approach).
251. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744.
252. Id. at 2740. The Court stated that prior precedent (specifically, In re Sawyer, 360
U.S. 622 (1959) and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)) demonstrated that attorneys'
speech can be regulated under a more deferential standard than that mandated by Nebraska
Press and other earlier prior restraint cases. Id. at 2744. The Court adopts a highly formalistic
approach to the First Amendment that differentiates between restraints imposed upon the press
and restraints imposed upon press sources. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text
(describing formalistic analysis of restraints on press). Given the majority's endorsement of
this formalistic approach in Gentile, the Court assumedly would employ a similar analysis to
determine when resort to an indirect restraint is constitutional. See supra note 113 (mentioning
questions left unresolved by Nebraska Press). Applying this formalistic analysis, the Supreme
Court would distinguish a participant-directed gag order from a prior restraint and apply an
intermediate level of review similar to the test approved by the Second Circuit in Dow Jones.
See supra notes 120-26 (describing Second Circuit's analysis in Dow Jones). But see Swift,
Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 70 (arguing that there is no basis for drawing distinction
between imposition of prior restraint on media and imposition of prior restraint on individual).
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ciary duty not to participate in public debate that will obstruct the fair
administration of criminal justice2 3 This duty arises from attorneys' special
access to information through discovery and client contact, and the threat
that the public will view the attorneys' statements as especially authoritative.2 14 The Court, therefore, held in Gentile that, because of an attorney's
special duty, the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard strikes
a constitutionally acceptable balance between the First Amendment rights
of attorneys involved in pending litigation and the state's interest in fair
trials. 23
In analyzing the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard
under the Seattle Times balancing approach, the Supreme Court in Gentile
stated that the lower standard protects the integrity of a state's judicial
system while imposing only narrow and necessary limitations on attorneys'
speech. 2 6 In examining the state's interest, the Court noted that the right
to a fair trial, unaffected by extrajudicial statements, is one of the most
fundamental rights assured by the Constitution.2 - 7 The rule's limitations on

253. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 11l S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
254. Id. at 2745. The contention that attorneys' speech will be construed as especially
authoritative denotes a simplistic understanding of the average citizen's perception of attorneys.
The average citizen understands that attorneys are paid advocates and that their statements
may or may not represent the truth. See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 95
(dismissing claim that attorney speech is more authoritative). Swift suggests that attorney
speech does not create a genuine threat because the public understands a defense attorney's
partisan role. Id. argues that the public recognizes that defendants generally claim innocence
and views information generated by the defense as being biased and less authoritative. Id. See
also Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 1181, 1239 (1986) (arguing that public does not perceive attorneys' comments, made
in role of advocate, as especially truthful).
255. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
256. Id.
257. Id. (relying on Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 350-51 and Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965)). Justice Rehnquist is correct in asserting that the defendant's right
to fair trial is one of the most fundamental of constitutional interests. Turner, 379 U.S. at
473. However, the Court in Gentile fails to distinguish between a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to fair trial and the state's right to ensure a fair trial. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745. The
threat of trial publicity posed by a defense attorney's extrajudicial statements more directly
involves a state's interest in an impartial jury and in preserving the integrity of the adversarial
system. See Tony Mauro, Judicial Dignity More Pressing than Free Speech, CoHN. LAw TRm.,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 21 (discussing Justices' concern during Gentile oral arguments for dignity
of trial process); Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 66 (noting that interests involved
are state's interest in criminal justice system rather than defendant's Sixth Amendment interest).
There is little support for finding that the State's right to ensure fair trial or trial integrity
rises to the constitutional level of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right. See supra note 207
(comparing defendant's Sixth Amendment to fair trial to state's right to preserve trial integrity).
For a thorough discussion of the state's interest in an impartial jury see Swift, Defense
Publicity, supra note 82, at 66, 87 (stating that government's right to impartial jury is not
constitutionally mandated and may be considered less crucial than concurrent defendant's
right). A state's right to protect trial integrity is not of constitutional magnitude. Id. Therefore,
applying the Court's Seattle balancing approach, it is highly questionable whether a state's
right to protect trial integrity outweighs an individual's explicit constitutional right to free
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lawyer's speech punish comments likely to influence the actual outcome of
the trial and comments likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an
untainted jury ultimately can be impaneled. 25 Additionally, the numerous
remedies available to a trial judge to alleviate massive media coverage may
be ineffective in nullifying the effects of prejudice and will entail serious
costs to the criminal justice system. 9 The Court also examined the limitations on First Amendment rights and found that the restrictions are limited,
are neutral as to points of view and merely postpone comment until after
the trial.m Because the Court found that the restrictions are narrowly
tailored and the state's interest especially important, the Court held that
the substantial likelihood standard was
a constitutionally permissible balance
26
of the state's and attorneys' rights. '
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, dissented from the Court's holding that the substantial likelihood standard struck a constitutionally permissible balance between the
262
state's interest in trial integrity and attorneys' First Amendment rights.
Justice Kennedy noted that the Court had previously only applied the more
deferential balancing test to commercial speech or to the release of information obtained exclusively through judicial discovery. 263 Further, the dissent
argued that neither of these two categories, nor the policy reasons behind
their creation, are implicated in Gentile.2 4 Rather, the dissent argued that
the speech at issue was core political
speech and that a balancing test was
265
inappropriate in this context.
The dissent took issue with the majority's underlying assumption that
a court can regulate an attorney's speech to a greater extent than a court
can regulate an ordinary citizen's speech. 2" Justice Kennedy noted that the
speech at issue in Gentile, and that within the scope of Rule 177, did not
originate from either judicial discovery or any special access that Gentile
enjoyed.2 7 The speech was, therefore, not subject to restriction under the

speech even if the there is a genuine threat to trial integrity. See id. at 66 (noting that effects
of defense publicity may not outweigh First Amendment invasion). It has even been suggested
that restricting an attorney's right to speak constitutes a greater invasion of free speech than
does a restraint on the press. See id. (noting possibility that defense attorney's First Amendment
interest is stronger than media's interest).
258. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2733 (1991).
259. See id. (questioning effectiveness of alternatives to gag orders).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2733 (1991). Justice Kennedy
accurately points out that the question of whether the standard was constitutionally acceptable
did not have to be decided in Gentile since the Court had already struck down Rule 177 for
vagueness. Id.
263. Id. at 2733.
264. Id.
265. Id
266. Id. at 2732.
267. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2733 (1991).
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Seattle Times rationale. 268 Justice Kennedy also accurately pointed out that
the proposition that the regulation of an attorney's speech is necessary to
269
preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings emerges only from dicta.
Additionally, Kennedy stated that several Supreme Court cases recognize
that disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity
within the scope of the First Amendment's protection.7 0
The dissent in Gentile also argued that, even if the Rehnquist majority
was correct and that the appropriate test is the Seattle Times balance, Rule
177 still failed to meet the inquiry required by that precedent. 27' First, the
dissent pointed out that there was little evidence to support the contention
that the danger of prejudice resulting from media coverage was anything
but rare. 272 Second, the dissent argued that Seattld Times recognizes that
the restriction on speech must be as narrow as possible and that there
cannot be any effective alternatives available. 273 According to Justice Kennedy, the majority failed to offer convincing reasons that demonstrate why
a lower standard of review was necessary and why alternatives to speech
limitations could not alleviate the rare instance when a real danger of
274
prejudice existed.

III.

ANA.Ysis AND COMMENTARY

The Supreme Court's opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada is
unsatisfactory because the majority's analysis failed to adopt a strict scrutiny
approach consistent with the First Amendment jurisprudence on freedom
of the press and speech. 27 1 Instead, the Court applied a lesser standard of
review embodied in a wide open balance that neither demands that the
restriction be narrowly tailored nor demands that the state's interesf be
compelling.27 6 The Gentile majority could justify the imposition of this less

268. Id. Justice Kennedy comments that the press could have obtained much of the
information in Gentile's remarks to the press "by explicit reference or fair inference in earlier
press reports." Id. Further, because Gentile's press conference occurred prior to his formal
participation in the criminal proceeding (before discovery), Gentile did not acquire any of his
information through judicial processes. Id. Thus, Kennedy accurately concludes that Rule 177
is not limited to preventing the release of information gained through discovery or any other
special access afforded an attorney. Id.
269. Id. at 2733-34 (attributing proposition to obiter dicta from In re Sawyer, Sheppard
and Nebraska Press).
270. Id. at 2734.
271. Id.
272. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734 (1991).
273. See supra note 250 (discussing test set forth in Seattle Times).
274. Id. at 2735.
275. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745 (adopting substantial likelihood of material prejudice
standard).
276. Id. at 2733. Justice Kennedy notes that the Court employs a "wide-open" balancing
of interests that is appropriate only for commercial speech or speech pertaining to the
dissemination of judicially acquired information. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2733. Kennedy argues
that this "wide-open" balancing is inappropriate for speech concerning political and prosecutor
abuse, speech traditionally at the core of the First Amendment. Id.
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exacting standard only through an inaccurate characterization" of an attorney's constitutional right to freedom of speech 2 7 and by a complete dismissal
of both the media's right to gather information and the public's right to
receive information. 278 The Rehnquist opinion bases its application of a
lesser standard of review on unsupportable conclusions about the facts at
issue, First Amendment law and the constitutional interests of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. 279
The Court in Gentile concluded that the substantial likelihQod of harm
test strikes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys and the state's interest in fair trials. 2 0 The Court's
conclusion that a lower standard of review is supportable, however, only if
one accepts the Court's seemingly inaccurate characterization of the primary
interests involved. 28 First, the Rehnquist majority deliberately ignored the
277. This note will leave extensive discussions of the speech interests implicated by
restrictions on attorney speech to others and will instead focus on the Court's failure to
consider the media rights at issue in Gentile. For a brief discussion of the speech interests
implicated by restrictions on attorney speech, see Swartz, supra note 21, at 1421-24 (discussing
speech interests of gagged trial participants).
278. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: the Search
for a ConstitutionalPrinciple, 68 CAL. L. Ra,. 482 (1980) (discussing public right to receive
information). The scope of the public's right to receive information has been a subject of
much debate. Many commentators acknowledge a limited public right to receive information.
If such a right did exist, it would obviously add to the magnitude of the First Amendment
interests at stake in Gentile. For a thorough discussion of the relevance of a public right to
receive information on indirect restraints see Todd, supra note 53, at 1188-93 (discussing public
right to receive information and indirect restraints).
279. Gentile, IIl S. Ct. at 2740-45.
280. Id. at 2745.
281. See id. at 2740-45 (weighing state interest and attorneys' interests). The- interests
involved on the state interest side of the balance are: the state's interest in preserving the
integrity of the adversary system and ensuring an impartial jury for the prosecution. In Gentile,
the Court inaccurately lumped the state's interest together with the defendant's Sixth Amendment interest in a fair trial. The interests involved on the First Amendment side of the balance
are: the attorney's right to speak; the media's right to gather news and retaining access to
public information; and the public's right to know information about the judicial system. This
note will focus primarily on the media's interest in gathering news and retaining access to
information not subject to government control and will not rely on the added constitutional
weight of a public right to know. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing briefly
public right to know). Yet, even excluding the public right to know, the media's constitutional
interests, in combination with the attorney's constitutional right to free speech, are sufficient
to outweigh the government interest in preventing prejudicial pretrial publicity. In addition, it
is apparent that many of the court's assumptions about the speech at issue in Gentile are
highly questionable. For instance, the Court's imposition of a fiduciary duty on an attorney
forms the basis for its regulation of attorney speech. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation,
supra note 92, at 1023-28 (discussing potential for regulation of attorney speech based on
imposition of fiduciary duty). Could the Court likewise impose a fiduciary duty and thereby
regulate the speech of a teacher in a state school, a doctor in a state clinic, a librarian in a
state library? The result of such reasoning could lead to the regulation of a wide array of
state actors. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991) (rejecting "unconstitutional
privilege" doctrine's application to abortion counseling based on similar reasoning). For added
discussion of an attorney's speech interest see Swartz, supra note 21, at 1427 (stating that
fiduciary duty rationale may constitute an unconstitutional conditioning of privilege).
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media's First Amendment interest in gathering news and maintaining access
to public information. 2s2 While this right is not without limit, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that a qualified right to gather news exists. 232
Courts typically restrict the scope of this right to access to information
acquired lawfully or access to information within the public realm. 28 Within
the context of judicial proceedings and the legal system, the Supreme Court
has, in fact, firmly established the right of access to information divulged
285
in trial proceedings.

The Supreme Court implied that the information restricted by a Gentile
rule is information obtained due to an attorney's privileged access to the

282. Gentile, Ill S. Ct. at 2743-45 (discussing First Amendment interests without mentioning media's right to gather and disseminate speech of willing speaker). While the media's
right to gather news and disseminate it is not without limit, the process of obtaining information
does receive qualified protection under the First Amendment. See Bjork, supra note 32, at
188-94 (discussing media's right to gather information); NmMR, supra note 24, § 4.09(A)-441 (stating that media's right to gather information and disseminate it receives qualified
protection).
283. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (recognizing
right of access to criminal trials as one of several rights, "that, while not unambiguously
enumerated . . ., are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights");
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (holding that press has First
Amendment right to gather information in the context of criminal trials); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (noting that media has right of access to public information equal
to public right); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (same). But see Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 17 (noting that "the right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information"), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
284. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding that
information lawfully obtained can not be punished absent state interest of highest order);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976) (stating that information in public
domain can not be restricted); Richmond Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 556 (suggesting public
forum standard in which press has access to forums or institutions that are public in nature);
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (stating that once
information is in public domain its dissemination can not be constitutionally restrained); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (noting that states can not punish
dissemination of information in public records); see also NrMER, supra note 24, § 4.09(B)-445 (noting that Supreme Court's limits right to gather information based upon perceived
distinction between non-speech and speech restrictions). Nimmer states that a restriction on
the right to gather information is presumptively valid if the feared injury that causes the
restriction is incurred for reasons other than the dissemination of the information thus gathered.
Id. at 4-46. Thus, restrictions on gathering information in a prison are presumptively valid if
the discussion and questioning of inmates threatens the state's interest in internal security
within prisons. Id. Alternatively, if a court imposes a restriction primarily to prevent the
dissemination of the information gathered, the restriction will be presumptively invalid if the
information to be disseminated constitutes speech and if its dissemination is protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 4-50. Under this analysis, it would appear that a Gentile restriction
is presumptively invalid because a court imposes the restraint solely to prevent media dissemination of the information gathered because this dissemination will threaten the integrity of
the adversary system.
285. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note 92, at 1007 (noting that access
to information about legal system and judicial proceedings is unequivocally established).
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processes under the judiciary's control. 216 However, a Gentile rule does not
limit its circumscription to material gained because of an attorney's privileged access but instead restricts the dissemination of information obtained
27
through an attorney's own investigation and from client communications. 1
The information restricted in Gentile was, in fact, public, because the
2s
information was beyond the scope of government control. A Gentile rule,
under these circumstances, allows a court to effectively disrupt a communicative act between a willing speaker conveying information outside of
government control to the media; this disruption violates both the media's
constitutional interest in gathering information and the attorney's constitutional right to free speech. 219 In reviewing the constitutionality of restrichas established strict scrutiny
tions on gathering news, the Supreme 2Court
9
as the appropriate standard of review. 0
Moreover, the Court's approval in Gentile of the substantial likelihood
test and the use of intermediate level balancing were based upon the
obfuscation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and
the state's interest in preserving the adversarial system and guaranteeing the
prosecution an impartial jury. 29' The Rehnquist majority muddled these two

286. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Ill S. Ct. 2720, 2744-45 (1991). The Court analogizes
the circumstances in Gentile to those in Seattle Times, where a litigant disseminated information
obtained exclusively through court-ordered discovery, and to the circumstances in Sheppard
and Nebraska Press where a court controlled trial participants because the judicial procedure
has begun. Id. at 2744. The Court stated that "[b]ecause lawyers have special access to
information through discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose
a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers' statements are likely to be
received as especially authoritative." Id. at 2745.
287. Gentile, Ill S. Ct. at 2733 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
288. See id. Justice Kennedy also stresses this point in his dissenting opinion. Id. Kennedy
argues that the cases relied upon to support intermediate balancing involve either commercial
speech by attorneys or court control of information acquired solely through the discovery
process. Id. He accurately points out that neither category, nor the underlying reasons justifying
their creation, is involved in Gentile. Id. See also Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra
note 92, at 1007-08 (stating that in Bridges v. California Supreme Court explicitly rejected
state's contention that trial judge could restrict out-of-court publicity).
289. See NnmEai, supra note 24, § 4.09(B)-4-43 (discussing right to gather information).
Nimmer, in defining the right to gather information, categorizes the right as:
narrower in scope than the general audience interest in speech in that it assumes
that the speech has either already occurred . . ., or that it will occur in that a willing
speaker will engage in speech without interference. The consent of the actual or
putative speaker to permit the content of his speech to be disseminated is assumed.
So is the lawfulness of the communication. The only issue posed is as to the right
of press or public to be in such physical propinquity with a setting of event, or with
a document of speaker, so as to make possible the gathering of the "information."
Id.
290. See Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra note 92, at 1015 (relying on Court's
use of strict scrutiny review in Globe Newspapers).
291. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745 (obfuscating defendant's right to fair trial and state's
interest in trial integrity). While the state's interest at stake will occasionally be in preserving
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair trial rather than its own right to an impartial jury,
it is evident that courts will usually invoke the Gentile rule to discipline a defense attorney
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distinct interests primarily by relying on Sheppard and Nebraska Press, two
cases that implicated the defendant's, and not the state's, right to a fair
trial. 292 Although the state does have an important interest in maintaining
the integrity of the adversary system and jury impartiality, 293 this government
right is not of the same magnitude as a defendant's absolute Sixth Amendment right to fair tria. 294 Thus, "where the defendant's Sixth Amendment

for comments related to pending litigation. See Robert P. Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press:
An Opportunity for Coexistence, 29 STAN. L. REv. 561, 569-70 (arguing that gag order will
apply mainly to defense attorneys). Courts will typically invoke a Gentile rule primarily against
defense counsel because the restriction applies to comments related to pending litigation. Id.
While the prosecutor and state will have carte blanche to establish a public record and leak
information to the press before an indictment is pending, a defense counsel will attempt to
reply to the state's allegations only after the state has indicted the attorney's client. Id. Thus,
courts most often will enforce Gentile rules to restrict a defense attorney's communications
with the media made on the defendant's behalf. Id.; see also Nat Hentoff, Muzzling Defense
Attorneys, WASH. PosT, June 8, 1991, at A21 (noting prominent prosecutors disregard of
ethical restrictions on speech). Hentoff notes that when Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
announced the indictment of a failed savings and loan executive, he described the defendant
to the press as "one of the biggest savings and loan bandits in Texas." Id. Hentoff concludes
that "when the chief legal officer of the United States so cavalierly jettisons the presumption
of innocence, one might expect that the American Bar Association or some other guardian of
the ethics of the profession would reprimand him. It didn't happen." Id.
Where a court invokes a Gentile rule to discipline a defense attorney, there is no Sixth
Amendment right to fair trial at stake. While it is evident that a Gentile rule's silencing effect
on prosecutors also implicates the media's right to gather information, restrictions on prosecutors are less problematic for several reasons. See Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra
note 92, at 1005-06 n.13 (discussing implications of restrictions on prosecutors). First, evidence
suggests that threat of prejudicial publicity most often results from leaks by prosecutors and
other state agents. Id. Secondly, unlike defense attorneys, prosecutors are employees of the
state whose speech can be limited because of this relationship. Id. Finally, prosecutors do not
bear the same burden as defense attorneys for protecting the public against political and
judicial abuses. Id. See also Marcia Coyle & Fred Strasser, Split Rulings on Speech Puzzle
Many, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1991, at 5 (arguing for different standards for prosecutors and
defense attorneys).
292. Gentile, Il1 S. Ct. at 2744-45. The Court obfuscated these two distinct interests:
"few, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair
trial by 'impartial' jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate
that fundamental right." Id. at 2745.
293. See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 86-100 (discussing government right
to control adversary system and preserve jury impartiality). The Supreme Court has consistently
held that the government has a right to control the adversary system and maintain jury
impartiality. Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (recognizing that government
has interest in trying cases by jury); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (noting
that maintenance of jury is important); Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887)
(stating that impartiality requires freedom from any prejudice to prosecution, as well as
freedom from any bias against accused). But see Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490
U.S. 504, 509 (1989) (stating that Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant certain fair trial
rights not extended to prosecution).
294. See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note 82, at 87-88 (stating that government right
to ensure jury impartiality is of lesser constitutional magnitude than defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair trial); Stern, supra note 104, at 101 (stating that government interest is not
of constitutional magnitude).
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right to a fair trial conflicts with the media's and attorneys' First Amendment rights, the First Amendment rights may have to give way to the Sixth
Amendment right. 295 On the other hand, it is unlikely that the nonconstitutional state's interest in preserving the adversary system or in maintaining
jury impartiality outweighs the express constitutional mandates that guarantee an attorney's right to free speech and the media's right to gather
information. It is even more unlikely that the state right will outweigh two
express constitutional guarantees where the state has failed to produce
296
evidence of a genuine threat to jury impartiality.
The Supreme Court's failure in Gentile to consider the media's interest
in news gathering, and its conspicuous mischaracterization of the attorney's
speech interest at stake, led the Court to underestimate the First Amendment
rights at stake in that case. Simultaneously, the Court's failure to distinguish
between a defendant's constitutional right to fair trial and a state's nonconstitutional right to maintain jury impartiality caused the Court in Gentile
to overestimate the countervailing interest. These two mistakes resulted in
a balance that led the Court to erroneously conclude that the state's interest
in ensuring jury impartiality outweighs both the attorneys' and the media's
First Amendment rights. Additionally, the Court applied what Justice Kennedy referred to as a wide-open balancing test, previously reserved for lowvalue speech.. 97 This wide-open balancing, or intermediate scrutiny, does
not contain a narrowly tailored means component and allows the Court to
validate what amounts to a perpetual gag restriction on all attorneys involved
in any pending litigation. This type of blanket restriction of speech is
unprecedented, as is the Gentile Court's application of a less-than-strict
scrutiny standard to speech that is traditionally at the core of the First
29
Amendment's protection. 1
295. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (noting that "primary concern of all must be
the proper administration of justice; that the life of liberty of any individual in this land
should not be put in jeopardy because of actions of the news media"), reh'g denied, 382 U.S.
875 (1965).
296. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect of Gentile
rule). A Gentile rule chills attorney speech in all litigation, civil and criminal, and does so
without any evidence of a genuine threat to jury impartiality. In fact, evidence suggests that
a genuine threat to jury impartiality is relatively rare. See Swift, Defense Publicity, supra note
82, at 94 (concluding that occasions where government right to impartial jury will be threatened
are extremely rare); Stern, supra note 104, at 101 (same). There is a long line of Supreme
Court cases, including one reviewed in the same term as Gentile, that support the contention
that cases where extensive publicity will violate defendant's right to fair trial are extremely
rare. See, e.g., Mu' Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (rejecting defendant's appeal for violation
of right to fair trial because of pretrial publicity), reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 13 (1991); Davis
v. Florida, 473 U.S. 913 (1985) (denying ceriorari to defendant's appeal for violation of Sixth
Amendment right to fair trial caused by pretrial publicity); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794
(1975) (holding that juror exposure to prejudicial information, by itself, did not violate due
process); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1964) (holding that adverse publicity did not violate
defendant's right to fair trial); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (same), reh'g denied, 370
U.S. 965 (1962).
297. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Ill S. Ct. 2720, 2733 (1991).
298. See James, supra note 91, at S4 (arguing that prior to Gentile, stricter standard of
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The application of a strict scrutiny standard in Gentile, on the contrary,

would have necessarily resulted in the invalidation of the speech restriction.
A strict scrutiny standard demands that the state show a compelling interest,
that the interest outweigh the countervailing interest that the state seeks to
restrict, and, finally, that the means by which the state seeks to preserve

its compelling interest be the least restrictive means available. 299 The state
interests at stake in Gentile, the preservation of jury impartiality and the
maintenance an effective adversary system, are indeed compelling.? ° The
jury system is at the very roots of the American judicial system and courts
must consider any risk to this system to be of the highest magnitude.

However, the countervailing interests at stake in Gentile, a private citizen's
right to speak freely and the media's right to gather public information,

are both of an even higher magnitude, and their sum far outweighs the
state's interest.
Even if the the weight of two express constitutional rights is discounted,
the narrowly tailored requirement in a strict scrutiny standard assures that
a court could not possibly uphold a restriction as broad as a Gentile ruleA0°
First, courts and bar associations have created the Gentile rule to provide
a comprehensive guide for a myriad of situations. 3°2 The unavoidable
generality inherent in such a guide will necessarily cause the rule to be
overbroad. 0 3 Second, a Gentile rule is not effective in alleviating prejudicial
review seemed to mandate application of maximum First Amendment protection for any state
attempt to control statements about judicial proceedings to press); Swartz, supra note 21, at
1435-36 (arguing that highest standard of review is in accord with First Amendment principles).
299. See NIMMER, supra note 24, § 2.05(B)(4)-2-39-40, n.89 (discussing strict scrutiny
review).
300. See supra notes 197, 257 (describing state interest in trial integrity).
301. See Swartz, supra note 21, at 1438-41 (discussing less restrictive alternative requirement); Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra note 92, at 1015-20 (discussing narrowly
tailored requirement). Swift divides the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny into
three separate requirements: specificity; empirically-demonstrable means-ends nexus; and less
restrictive alternative. Id. at 1015. Swift determines that Model Rule 3.6, the prototypical
Gentile rule, fails all three of the requirements. Id. at 1016-1020. See also EMERSON, SYSTEM,
supra note 61, at 463-64 (discussing attorneys' First Amendment rights to be free of extrajudicial
restrictions on speech). Emerson notes that "[t]o limit unduly the role of attorneys in discussing
the administration of justice, including pending matters, would thus encroach seriously upon
the system of freedom of expression." Id. at 464.
302. But see Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745-28 (Rehnquist dissenting) (arguing that Gentile
rule is not overbroad). The contention that Gentile rules will be overbroad is supported by
the Supreme Court's holding in Gentile that the safe harbor provision of Rule 177 was voidfor-vagueness. Gentile, I11 S. Ct. at 2731. The safe harbor, because of its deficient language,
did not provide lawyers with sufficient notice. Id. This stricken provision is identical to that
used by Model Rule 3.6 which is the prototype for most state's Gentile rules. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991 ed.). The inability of the ABA to develop
an adequate guide to when an attorney's speech will not be subject to punishment, demonstrates
the overbreadth of any rule which tries to serve as a guide for an infinite number of situations.
303. See Swift, UnconstitutionalRegulation, supra note 92, at 1016 (stating that underlying
rationale of specificity requirement is that broadly worded regulations restrict speech even
where no harm is likely). Swift points out that the Supreme Court has struck down professional
attorney regulations which are overbroad. Id. at 1017.
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publicity because, as a disciplinary rule, it can restrict only an attorney; the
media can still obtain information from attorneys off the record or from a
defendant speaking without counsel. 3°4 Consequently, a Gentile rule is an
ineffective means of achieving the state's desired end. Third, the Supreme
Court precedent itself suggests that the threat to jury impartiality resulting
5
from extensive media publicity is extremely rare. 0 Therefore, a Gentile rule
6
is not necessary in the majority of instances.2 Finally, where a genuine
threat to trial integrity exists, the state has a less restrictive method for
alleviating the threat available to it.? 7 The state can impose a participantdirected gag order of limited scope that will only abridge First Amendment
0
rights in a particular case based on concrete findings. Thus, the use of a
narrow indirect restraint is preferable to the use of a blanket rule that
restricts First Amendment rights in all litigation without regard to the
authenticity of a threat to trial integrity. °9

304. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (requiring showing
that means of alleviating threat to fair trial will be effective). The inability of an attorney to
speak to the media on behalf of his client may create undesirable results in many cases. An
innocent defendant, faced with a long delay for potential acquittal, may want to respond to
a negative record established prior to indictment by the prosecution and police in order to
dispel suspicion or opprobrium. The defendant will have to face the media without the advice
of counsel which could lead to disastrous consequences to the defendant. See United States v.
Garsson, 291 F. Supp. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (stating that "indictments are calamities to
honest men"); Swartz, supra note 21, at 1422 (stating that after indictment public opinion
mounts against accused and accused's interest in responding to charges is at peak). For a
insightful discussion of the accused's interest in preserving the attorney's freedom of speech
see Stern, supra note 104, at 98-101 (describing accused's interest in attorney speech).
305. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing Court's reluctance to find
publicity resulted in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair trial). See also
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551, 554, 565 (1976) (stating that threat to
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to fair trial from extensive publicity is extremely rare).
306. See id. at 1018-19 (discussing means-ends nexus requirement). Swift notes that in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 (1982), the Court "made clear
that the test could not be satisfied where the connection between the means and the ends was
speculative." Id. at 1019.
307. See supra note 301 and accompanying text (describing narrowly tailored requirement).
308. See id. at 1020 (arguing that even where state interest is compelling, if state can
preserve its interest through ad hoc application of restrictions tailored to particular circumstances instead of general rule, ad hoc application is constitutionally required). See also
Matheson, supra note 83, at 932 (stating that court should employ indirect restraints before
Gentile rules because they are less restrictive).
309. See Swift, Unconstitutional Regulation, supra note 92, at 1051 (recognizing that
indirect restraint is preferable to Gentile rule and that pre-Gentile Supreme Court precedent
supports this). As of yet, discounting the ramifications of Gentile to indirect restraints, the
Supreme Court has yet to resolve the question of when an indirect restraint can be imposed
constitutionally. See supra note 118 (noting Supreme Court's reluctance to consider constitutionality of resort to indirect restraint). The Supreme Court should address the question in
order to resolve longstanding confusion and inconsistency among state and federal courts' use
of gag orders. See supra notes 113-15 (recognizing state and federal courts' differing uses of
indirect restraints). While this author agrees with Swift that indirect restraints are a more
preferable means of alleviating the threat to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
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IMPLICATIONS FOR A FREE PRESS

Justice Stewart once stated that the purpose of the free press guarantee
was to "create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional
check on the three official branches." 310 This notion that freedom of the
press is inextricably tied to the prevention of political abuses and the
maintenance of an informed democracy has prevailed virtually unchallenged
for two hundred years and has been well grounded in Supreme Court
jurisprudence."' The Supreme Court has held that the importance of the
press' checking function is especially meaningful in the context of the
judicial process where society airs and debates so many modern social and
political controversies. 1 2 In light of this strong commitment to a free press,
it seems especially strange that on the two hundredth birthday of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada would
disable so perfunctorily the press: ability to act as a check on the judicial
system." 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Gentile strikes a significant blow to
the freedom long enjoyed by the press in the United States. The Gentile
decision installs as current doctrine a highly formalistic interpretation of
the Free Press Clause.31 4 The Court's analysis in Gentile fails to acknowledge
that the imposition of a blanket speech restriction on the media's potential
sources is a deliberate circumvention of the well-established prohibition on

trial, the author emphasizes that courts should resort to an indirect restraint or gag order only
when the court determines that all other means of alleviating the threat are ineffective. See
supra note 301 and accompanying text (describing least restrictive alternative requirement). In
order for a court to determine that this least restrictive means inquiry has been made, the
court should satisfy the Nebraska Press three-pronged test prior to the imposition of an
indirect restraint. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562 (describing three-pronged test). The
application of the Nebraska Press requirements to the indirect restraint context would reflect
accurately the fact that a court's purpose in imposing either a prior restraints or an indirect
restraints is the same, regulation of the dissemination of information about the judicial process.
See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (discussing realistic approach to analysis of
press restraints). An equally satisfactory alternative to the invocation of the Nebraska Press
test is the adoption of the "serious and imminent threat" standard. See supra notes 127-34
and accompanying text (describing Sixth Circuit's approach in CBS).
310. Stewart, supra note 19, at 634.
311. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTTrUTIONAL POWERS OF

THE PEOPLE 75 (1960) (discussing press' checking function on political and judicial abuses).
312. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976) (noting that
presumption against prior restraints is particularly important in context of judicial reporting).
313. See James, supra note 91, at S4 (reacting to Gentile decision). The author concludes
that:
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Rehnquist majority in Gentile is
advancing a judicial philosophy that has less to do with the actual issues in the case
than with the larger isgue of the role of a lawyer in the judicial system. It is
particularly troublesome because this outcome, based on a broad and general rule,
leaves so many practical concerns unanswered.
Id.
314. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing formalistic analysis of
speech restrictions).
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prior restraints on the press."' Although Gentile rules do not directly enjoin
the dissemination of information by the media, they achieve the same result
by effectively limiting the media's ability to gather public information about
the judicial processes.1 6 Further, the Gentile decision provides judges with
an extremely broad and heavy-handed means of alleviating the seemingly
rare occurrence of a threat to a defendant's right to a fair trial or an abuse.
31 7
of the trial processes.
The consequences of the Gentile decision have not yet manifested
themselves. However, after states complete the minor revisions of their
Gentile rules to eliminate vague safe harbor provisions, courts will enforce
Gentile rules more routinely, leading to a marked reduction in the communications between attorneys and the media. 38 Attorneys have little to
gain personally from exposing themselves to potential disciplinary proceedings and possible sanctions and will refrain from any contact with the media
during litigation. 3 9 The consequences of this First Amendment chill will be
a noticeable diminution in the ability of the media to report meaningfully
on the judicial processes and, concurrently, a decline in the ability of the
public td remain informed about and to participate in the judicial system. 20
Gregory A. Garbacz

315. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (discussing realistic analysis of speech
restrictions).
316. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing effect of indirect restraints

on news gathering process).
317. See James, supra note 95, at S4 (stating that Gentile rule creates limitation of First
Amendment protection "greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
government interest at stake ....
).
318. See generally News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499 (1991); United States
v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039 (1991).
319. See Coyle & Strasser, supra note 291, at 5 (noting that Gentile decision leaves lawyers

uncertain about their ability to speak).
320. See NimMR, supra note 24, § 1.02(H)-1-44-45 (discussing First Amendment selfgovernment and enlightenment functions).

